Annotation of embedaddon/dnsmasq/src/dnssec.c, revision 1.1.1.4
1.1 misho 1: /* dnssec.c is Copyright (c) 2012 Giovanni Bajo <rasky@develer.com>
1.1.1.3 misho 2: and Copyright (c) 2012-2020 Simon Kelley
1.1 misho 3:
4: This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
5: it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
6: the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or
7: (at your option) version 3 dated 29 June, 2007.
8:
9: This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10: but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11: MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
12: GNU General Public License for more details.
13:
14: You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
15: along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
16: */
17:
18: #include "dnsmasq.h"
19:
20: #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
21:
22: #define SERIAL_UNDEF -100
23: #define SERIAL_EQ 0
24: #define SERIAL_LT -1
25: #define SERIAL_GT 1
26:
27: /* Convert from presentation format to wire format, in place.
28: Also map UC -> LC.
29: Note that using extract_name to get presentation format
30: then calling to_wire() removes compression and maps case,
31: thus generating names in canonical form.
32: Calling to_wire followed by from_wire is almost an identity,
33: except that the UC remains mapped to LC.
1.1.1.2 misho 34:
35: Note that both /000 and '.' are allowed within labels. These get
36: represented in presentation format using NAME_ESCAPE as an escape
37: character. In theory, if all the characters in a name were /000 or
38: '.' or NAME_ESCAPE then all would have to be escaped, so the
39: presentation format would be twice as long as the spec (1024).
1.1.1.3 misho 40: The buffers are all declared as 2049 (allowing for the trailing zero)
1.1.1.2 misho 41: for this reason.
1.1 misho 42: */
43: static int to_wire(char *name)
44: {
1.1.1.2 misho 45: unsigned char *l, *p, *q, term;
1.1 misho 46: int len;
47:
48: for (l = (unsigned char*)name; *l != 0; l = p)
49: {
50: for (p = l; *p != '.' && *p != 0; p++)
51: if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'Z')
52: *p = *p - 'A' + 'a';
1.1.1.2 misho 53: else if (*p == NAME_ESCAPE)
54: {
55: for (q = p; *q; q++)
56: *q = *(q+1);
57: (*p)--;
58: }
1.1 misho 59: term = *p;
60:
61: if ((len = p - l) != 0)
62: memmove(l+1, l, len);
63: *l = len;
64:
65: p++;
66:
67: if (term == 0)
68: *p = 0;
69: }
70:
71: return l + 1 - (unsigned char *)name;
72: }
73:
74: /* Note: no compression allowed in input. */
75: static void from_wire(char *name)
76: {
1.1.1.2 misho 77: unsigned char *l, *p, *last;
1.1 misho 78: int len;
1.1.1.2 misho 79:
80: for (last = (unsigned char *)name; *last != 0; last += *last+1);
81:
1.1 misho 82: for (l = (unsigned char *)name; *l != 0; l += len+1)
83: {
84: len = *l;
85: memmove(l, l+1, len);
1.1.1.2 misho 86: for (p = l; p < l + len; p++)
87: if (*p == '.' || *p == 0 || *p == NAME_ESCAPE)
88: {
89: memmove(p+1, p, 1 + last - p);
90: len++;
91: *p++ = NAME_ESCAPE;
92: (*p)++;
93: }
94:
1.1 misho 95: l[len] = '.';
96: }
97:
98: if ((char *)l != name)
99: *(l-1) = 0;
100: }
101:
102: /* Input in presentation format */
103: static int count_labels(char *name)
104: {
105: int i;
1.1.1.3 misho 106: char *p;
107:
1.1 misho 108: if (*name == 0)
109: return 0;
110:
1.1.1.3 misho 111: for (p = name, i = 0; *p; p++)
112: if (*p == '.')
1.1 misho 113: i++;
114:
1.1.1.3 misho 115: /* Don't count empty first label. */
116: return *name == '.' ? i : i+1;
1.1 misho 117: }
118:
119: /* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */
1.1.1.2 misho 120: static int serial_compare_32(u32 s1, u32 s2)
1.1 misho 121: {
122: if (s1 == s2)
123: return SERIAL_EQ;
124:
125: if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) < (1UL<<31)) ||
126: (s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) > (1UL<<31)))
127: return SERIAL_LT;
128: if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) > (1UL<<31)) ||
129: (s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) < (1UL<<31)))
130: return SERIAL_GT;
131: return SERIAL_UNDEF;
132: }
133:
1.1.1.2 misho 134: /* Called at startup. If the timestamp file is configured and exists, put its mtime on
135: timestamp_time. If it doesn't exist, create it, and set the mtime to 1-1-2015.
136: return -1 -> Cannot create file.
137: 0 -> not using timestamp, or timestamp exists and is in past.
138: 1 -> timestamp exists and is in future.
139: */
140:
141: static time_t timestamp_time;
142:
143: int setup_timestamp(void)
1.1 misho 144: {
1.1.1.2 misho 145: struct stat statbuf;
146:
147: daemon->back_to_the_future = 0;
148:
149: if (!daemon->timestamp_file)
150: return 0;
151:
152: if (stat(daemon->timestamp_file, &statbuf) != -1)
153: {
154: timestamp_time = statbuf.st_mtime;
155: check_and_exit:
156: if (difftime(timestamp_time, time(0)) <= 0)
157: {
158: /* time already OK, update timestamp, and do key checking from the start. */
1.1.1.3 misho 159: if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, NULL) == -1)
1.1.1.2 misho 160: my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to update mtime on %s: %s"), daemon->timestamp_file, strerror(errno));
161: daemon->back_to_the_future = 1;
162: return 0;
163: }
164: return 1;
165: }
166:
167: if (errno == ENOENT)
168: {
169: /* NB. for explanation of O_EXCL flag, see comment on pidfile in dnsmasq.c */
170: int fd = open(daemon->timestamp_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NONBLOCK | O_EXCL, 0666);
171: if (fd != -1)
172: {
1.1.1.3 misho 173: struct timeval tv[2];
1.1.1.2 misho 174:
175: close(fd);
176:
1.1.1.3 misho 177: timestamp_time = 1420070400; /* 1-1-2015 */
178: tv[0].tv_sec = tv[1].tv_sec = timestamp_time;
179: tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
180: if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, tv) == 0)
1.1.1.2 misho 181: goto check_and_exit;
182: }
183: }
1.1 misho 184:
1.1.1.2 misho 185: return -1;
186: }
187:
188: /* Check whether today/now is between date_start and date_end */
1.1.1.3 misho 189: static int is_check_date(unsigned long curtime)
1.1.1.2 misho 190: {
1.1 misho 191: /* Checking timestamps may be temporarily disabled */
1.1.1.2 misho 192:
193: /* If the current time if _before_ the timestamp
194: on our persistent timestamp file, then assume the
195: time if not yet correct, and don't check the
196: key timestamps. As soon as the current time is
197: later then the timestamp, update the timestamp
198: and start checking keys */
199: if (daemon->timestamp_file)
200: {
201: if (daemon->back_to_the_future == 0 && difftime(timestamp_time, curtime) <= 0)
202: {
1.1.1.3 misho 203: if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, NULL) != 0)
1.1.1.2 misho 204: my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to update mtime on %s: %s"), daemon->timestamp_file, strerror(errno));
205:
1.1.1.3 misho 206: my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("system time considered valid, now checking DNSSEC signature timestamps."));
1.1.1.2 misho 207: daemon->back_to_the_future = 1;
1.1.1.3 misho 208: daemon->dnssec_no_time_check = 0;
1.1.1.2 misho 209: queue_event(EVENT_RELOAD); /* purge cache */
210: }
211:
1.1.1.3 misho 212: return daemon->back_to_the_future;
1.1.1.2 misho 213: }
1.1.1.3 misho 214: else
215: return !daemon->dnssec_no_time_check;
216: }
217:
218: /* Return bytes of canonicalised rrdata one by one.
219: Init state->ip with the RR, and state->end with the end of same.
220: Init state->op to NULL.
221: Init state->desc to RR descriptor.
222: Init state->buff with a MAXDNAME * 2 buffer.
223:
224: After each call which returns 1, state->op points to the next byte of data.
225: On returning 0, the end has been reached.
226: */
227: struct rdata_state {
228: u16 *desc;
229: size_t c;
230: unsigned char *end, *ip, *op;
231: char *buff;
232: };
233:
234: static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state *state)
1.1 misho 235: {
1.1.1.3 misho 236: int d;
1.1 misho 237:
1.1.1.3 misho 238: if (state->op && state->c != 1)
1.1.1.2 misho 239: {
1.1.1.3 misho 240: state->op++;
241: state->c--;
242: return 1;
1.1.1.2 misho 243: }
1.1.1.3 misho 244:
245: while (1)
246: {
247: d = *(state->desc);
1.1 misho 248:
1.1.1.3 misho 249: if (d == (u16)-1)
1.1 misho 250: {
1.1.1.3 misho 251: /* all the bytes to the end. */
252: if ((state->c = state->end - state->ip) != 0)
253: {
254: state->op = state->ip;
255: state->ip = state->end;;
256: }
257: else
258: return 0;
259: }
260: else
261: {
262: state->desc++;
263:
264: if (d == (u16)0)
265: {
266: /* domain-name, canonicalise */
267: int len;
268:
269: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, 1, 0) ||
270: (len = to_wire(state->buff)) == 0)
271: continue;
272:
273: state->c = len;
274: state->op = (unsigned char *)state->buff;
275: }
276: else
277: {
278: /* plain data preceding a domain-name, don't run off the end of the data */
279: if ((state->end - state->ip) < d)
280: d = state->end - state->ip;
281:
282: if (d == 0)
283: continue;
284:
285: state->op = state->ip;
286: state->c = d;
287: state->ip += d;
288: }
1.1 misho 289: }
290:
1.1.1.3 misho 291: return 1;
1.1 misho 292: }
293: }
294:
1.1.1.3 misho 295: /* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order. */
1.1 misho 296:
1.1.1.3 misho 297: static int sort_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int rrsetidx,
298: unsigned char **rrset, char *buff1, char *buff2)
1.1 misho 299: {
1.1.1.3 misho 300: int swap, i, j;
1.1 misho 301:
302: do
303: {
304: for (swap = 0, i = 0; i < rrsetidx-1; i++)
305: {
1.1.1.3 misho 306: int rdlen1, rdlen2;
307: struct rdata_state state1, state2;
308:
1.1 misho 309: /* Note that these have been determined to be OK previously,
310: so we don't need to check for NULL return here. */
1.1.1.3 misho 311: state1.ip = skip_name(rrset[i], header, plen, 10);
312: state2.ip = skip_name(rrset[i+1], header, plen, 10);
313: state1.op = state2.op = NULL;
314: state1.buff = buff1;
315: state2.buff = buff2;
316: state1.desc = state2.desc = rr_desc;
317:
318: state1.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
319: GETSHORT(rdlen1, state1.ip);
320: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state1.ip, plen, rdlen1))
321: return rrsetidx; /* short packet */
322: state1.end = state1.ip + rdlen1;
323:
324: state2.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
325: GETSHORT(rdlen2, state2.ip);
326: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state2.ip, plen, rdlen2))
327: return rrsetidx; /* short packet */
328: state2.end = state2.ip + rdlen2;
329:
330: /* If the RR has no names in it then canonicalisation
331: is the identity function and we can compare
332: the RRs directly. If not we compare the
333: canonicalised RRs one byte at a time. */
334: if (*rr_desc == (u16)-1)
1.1 misho 335: {
1.1.1.3 misho 336: int rdmin = rdlen1 > rdlen2 ? rdlen2 : rdlen1;
337: int cmp = memcmp(state1.ip, state2.ip, rdmin);
1.1 misho 338:
1.1.1.3 misho 339: if (cmp > 0 || (cmp == 0 && rdlen1 > rdmin))
1.1 misho 340: {
341: unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1];
342: rrset[i+1] = rrset[i];
343: rrset[i] = tmp;
1.1.1.3 misho 344: swap = 1;
345: }
346: else if (cmp == 0 && (rdlen1 == rdlen2))
347: {
348: /* Two RRs are equal, remove one copy. RFC 4034, para 6.3 */
349: for (j = i+1; j < rrsetidx-1; j++)
350: rrset[j] = rrset[j+1];
351: rrsetidx--;
352: i--;
1.1 misho 353: }
354: }
1.1.1.3 misho 355: else
356: /* Comparing canonicalised RRs, byte-at-a-time. */
357: while (1)
358: {
359: int ok1, ok2;
360:
361: ok1 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state1);
362: ok2 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state2);
363:
364: if (!ok1 && !ok2)
365: {
366: /* Two RRs are equal, remove one copy. RFC 4034, para 6.3 */
367: for (j = i+1; j < rrsetidx-1; j++)
368: rrset[j] = rrset[j+1];
369: rrsetidx--;
370: i--;
371: break;
372: }
373: else if (ok1 && (!ok2 || *state1.op > *state2.op))
374: {
375: unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1];
376: rrset[i+1] = rrset[i];
377: rrset[i] = tmp;
378: swap = 1;
379: break;
380: }
381: else if (ok2 && (!ok1 || *state2.op > *state1.op))
382: break;
383:
384: /* arrive here when bytes are equal, go round the loop again
385: and compare the next ones. */
386: }
1.1 misho 387: }
388: } while (swap);
1.1.1.3 misho 389:
390: return rrsetidx;
1.1 misho 391: }
392:
1.1.1.2 misho 393: static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
1.1 misho 394:
1.1.1.3 misho 395: /* Get pointers to RRset members and signature(s) for same.
1.1.1.2 misho 396: Check signatures, and return keyname associated in keyname. */
397: static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int type,
398: char *name, char *keyname, int *sigcnt, int *rrcnt)
1.1 misho 399: {
1.1.1.2 misho 400: static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0;
1.1 misho 401: unsigned char *p;
1.1.1.2 misho 402: int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
403: int gotkey = 0;
1.1 misho 404:
405: if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
1.1.1.3 misho 406: return 0;
1.1 misho 407:
1.1.1.2 misho 408: /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in the set. */
1.1 misho 409: for (rrsetidx = 0, sigidx = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount);
410: j != 0; j--)
411: {
412: unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
1.1.1.2 misho 413: int stype, sclass, type_covered;
1.1 misho 414:
415: pstart = p;
416:
417: if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
1.1.1.3 misho 418: return 0; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 419:
420: GETSHORT(stype, p);
421: GETSHORT(sclass, p);
1.1.1.3 misho 422:
1.1 misho 423: pdata = p;
424:
1.1.1.3 misho 425: p += 4; /* TTL */
1.1 misho 426: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
427:
428: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1.1.1.2 misho 429: return 0;
1.1 misho 430:
431: if (res == 1 && sclass == class)
432: {
433: if (stype == type)
434: {
435: if (!expand_workspace(&rrset, &rrset_sz, rrsetidx))
1.1.1.2 misho 436: return 0;
1.1 misho 437:
438: rrset[rrsetidx++] = pstart;
439: }
440:
441: if (stype == T_RRSIG)
442: {
443: if (rdlen < 18)
1.1.1.2 misho 444: return 0; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 445:
446: GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
1.1.1.2 misho 447: p += 16; /* algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration, sig_inception, key_tag */
448:
449: if (gotkey)
450: {
451: /* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all have same keyname */
452: if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0) != 1)
453: return 0;
454: }
455: else
456: {
457: gotkey = 1;
458:
459: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
460: return 0;
461:
462: /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST equal
463: the name of the zone containing the RRset. We can't tell that
464: for certain, but we can check that the RRset name is equal to
465: or encloses the signers name, which should be enough to stop
466: an attacker using signatures made with the key of an unrelated
467: zone he controls. Note that the root key is always allowed. */
468: if (*keyname != 0)
469: {
470: char *name_start;
471: for (name_start = name; !hostname_isequal(name_start, keyname); )
472: if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
473: name_start++; /* chop a label off and try again */
474: else
475: return 0;
476: }
477: }
478:
1.1 misho 479:
480: if (type_covered == type)
481: {
482: if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
1.1.1.2 misho 483: return 0;
1.1 misho 484:
485: sigs[sigidx++] = pdata;
486: }
487:
1.1.1.3 misho 488: p = pdata + 6; /* restore for ADD_RDLEN */
1.1 misho 489: }
490: }
491:
492: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1.1.1.2 misho 493: return 0;
1.1 misho 494: }
495:
1.1.1.2 misho 496: *sigcnt = sigidx;
497: *rrcnt = rrsetidx;
498:
499: return 1;
500: }
501:
502: /* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS reply
503: Return code:
504: STAT_SECURE if it validates.
505: STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of wildcard expansion.
506: (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard within name.)
507: STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet.
508: STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
509: STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
510:
511: If key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag given in the params of those names,
512: otherwise find the key in the cache.
513:
514: Name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and trashed.
515:
516: Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.
1.1.1.3 misho 517:
518: ttl_out is the floor on TTL, based on TTL and orig_ttl and expiration of sig used to validate.
1.1.1.2 misho 519: */
520: static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int type, int sigidx, int rrsetidx,
1.1.1.3 misho 521: char *name, char *keyname, char **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen,
522: int algo_in, int keytag_in, unsigned long *ttl_out)
1.1.1.2 misho 523: {
524: unsigned char *p;
1.1.1.3 misho 525: int rdlen, j, name_labels, algo, labels, key_tag;
1.1.1.2 misho 526: struct crec *crecp = NULL;
527: u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
1.1.1.3 misho 528: u32 sig_expiration, sig_inception;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 529: int failflags = DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG | DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV | DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEYSUP;
! 530:
1.1.1.3 misho 531: unsigned long curtime = time(0);
532: int time_check = is_check_date(curtime);
533:
1.1.1.2 misho 534: if (wildcard_out)
535: *wildcard_out = NULL;
1.1 misho 536:
1.1.1.2 misho 537: name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
538:
1.1 misho 539: /* Sort RRset records into canonical order.
540: Note that at this point keyname and daemon->workspacename buffs are
541: unused, and used as workspace by the sort. */
1.1.1.3 misho 542: rrsetidx = sort_rrset(header, plen, rr_desc, rrsetidx, rrset, daemon->workspacename, keyname);
1.1 misho 543:
544: /* Now try all the sigs to try and find one which validates */
545: for (j = 0; j <sigidx; j++)
546: {
547: unsigned char *psav, *sig, *digest;
548: int i, wire_len, sig_len;
549: const struct nettle_hash *hash;
550: void *ctx;
551: char *name_start;
1.1.1.3 misho 552: u32 nsigttl, ttl, orig_ttl;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 553:
! 554: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
1.1 misho 555:
556: p = sigs[j];
1.1.1.3 misho 557: GETLONG(ttl, p);
1.1 misho 558: GETSHORT(rdlen, p); /* rdlen >= 18 checked previously */
559: psav = p;
560:
561: p += 2; /* type_covered - already checked */
562: algo = *p++;
563: labels = *p++;
564: GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
565: GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
566: GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
567: GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
568:
569: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
570: return STAT_BOGUS;
571:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 572: if (!time_check)
! 573: failflags &= ~(DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV | DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP);
! 574: else
! 575: {
! 576: /* We must explicitly check against wanted values, because of SERIAL_UNDEF */
! 577: if (serial_compare_32(curtime, sig_inception) == SERIAL_LT)
! 578: continue;
! 579: else
! 580: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV;
! 581:
! 582: if (serial_compare_32(curtime, sig_expiration) == SERIAL_GT)
! 583: continue;
! 584: else
! 585: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP;
! 586: }
! 587:
! 588: if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))))
! 589: continue;
! 590: else
! 591: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEYSUP;
! 592:
! 593: if (labels > name_labels ||
1.1 misho 594: !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
595: continue;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 596:
1.1 misho 597: /* OK, we have the signature record, see if the relevant DNSKEY is in the cache. */
598: if (!key && !(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DNSKEY)))
599: return STAT_NEED_KEY;
1.1.1.3 misho 600:
601: if (ttl_out)
602: {
603: /* 4035 5.3.3 rules on TTLs */
604: if (orig_ttl < ttl)
605: ttl = orig_ttl;
606:
607: if (time_check && difftime(sig_expiration, curtime) < ttl)
608: ttl = difftime(sig_expiration, curtime);
609:
610: *ttl_out = ttl;
611: }
612:
1.1 misho 613: sig = p;
614: sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav);
615:
616: nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl);
617:
618: hash->update(ctx, 18, psav);
619: wire_len = to_wire(keyname);
620: hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char*)keyname);
621: from_wire(keyname);
1.1.1.3 misho 622:
623: #define RRBUFLEN 128 /* Most RRs are smaller than this. */
1.1 misho 624:
625: for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i)
626: {
1.1.1.3 misho 627: int j;
628: struct rdata_state state;
629: u16 len;
630: unsigned char rrbuf[RRBUFLEN];
1.1 misho 631:
632: p = rrset[i];
1.1.1.3 misho 633:
1.1 misho 634: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 10))
635: return STAT_BOGUS;
636:
637: name_start = name;
638:
639: /* if more labels than in RRsig name, hash *.<no labels in rrsig labels field> 4035 5.3.2 */
640: if (labels < name_labels)
641: {
1.1.1.3 misho 642: for (j = name_labels - labels; j != 0; j--)
1.1.1.2 misho 643: {
644: while (*name_start != '.' && *name_start != 0)
645: name_start++;
1.1.1.3 misho 646: if (j != 1 && *name_start == '.')
1.1.1.2 misho 647: name_start++;
648: }
649:
650: if (wildcard_out)
651: *wildcard_out = name_start+1;
652:
1.1 misho 653: name_start--;
654: *name_start = '*';
655: }
656:
657: wire_len = to_wire(name_start);
658: hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char *)name_start);
659: hash->update(ctx, 4, p); /* class and type */
660: hash->update(ctx, 4, (unsigned char *)&nsigttl);
1.1.1.3 misho 661:
662: p += 8; /* skip type, class, ttl */
1.1 misho 663: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
664: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
665: return STAT_BOGUS;
1.1.1.3 misho 666:
667: /* Optimisation for RR types which need no cannonicalisation.
668: This includes DNSKEY DS NSEC and NSEC3, which are also long, so
669: it saves lots of calls to get_rdata, and avoids the pessimal
670: segmented insertion, even with a small rrbuf[].
671:
672: If canonicalisation is not needed, a simple insertion into the hash works.
673: */
674: if (*rr_desc == (u16)-1)
675: {
676: len = htons(rdlen);
677: hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
678: hash->update(ctx, rdlen, p);
679: }
680: else
681: {
682: /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use
683: name buffer as workspace for get_rdata. */
684: state.ip = p;
685: state.op = NULL;
686: state.desc = rr_desc;
687: state.buff = name;
688: state.end = p + rdlen;
689:
690: for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
691: if (j < RRBUFLEN)
692: rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
693:
694: len = htons((u16)j);
695: hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
696:
697: /* If the RR is shorter than RRBUFLEN (most of them, in practice)
698: then we can just digest it now. If it exceeds RRBUFLEN we have to
699: go back to the start and do it in chunks. */
700: if (j >= RRBUFLEN)
701: {
702: state.ip = p;
703: state.op = NULL;
704: state.desc = rr_desc;
705:
706: for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
707: {
708: rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
709:
710: if (j == RRBUFLEN - 1)
711: {
712: hash->update(ctx, RRBUFLEN, rrbuf);
713: j = -1;
714: }
715: }
716: }
717:
718: if (j != 0)
719: hash->update(ctx, j, rrbuf);
720: }
1.1 misho 721: }
722:
723: hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
724:
725: /* namebuff used for workspace above, restore to leave unchanged on exit */
726: p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[0]);
1.1.1.4 ! misho 727: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0))
! 728: return STAT_BOGUS;
1.1 misho 729:
730: if (key)
731: {
732: if (algo_in == algo && keytag_in == key_tag &&
733: verify(key, keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
734: return STAT_SECURE;
735: }
736: else
737: {
738: /* iterate through all possible keys 4035 5.3.1 */
739: for (; crecp; crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now, F_DNSKEY))
740: if (crecp->addr.key.algo == algo &&
741: crecp->addr.key.keytag == key_tag &&
742: crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
743: verify(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
744: return (labels < name_labels) ? STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD : STAT_SECURE;
745: }
746: }
747:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 748: /* If we reach this point, no verifying key was found */
! 749: return STAT_BOGUS | failflags | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
1.1 misho 750: }
751:
1.1.1.2 misho 752:
1.1 misho 753: /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY query.
754: Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
755: return codes:
1.1.1.2 misho 756: STAT_OK Done, key(s) in cache.
757: STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be validated with DS,
758: or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid, bad packet.
759: STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found, name in keyname
760: STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a key not found, name in keyname
1.1 misho 761: */
762: int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
763: {
764: unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
765: struct crec *crecp, *recp1;
1.1.1.3 misho 766: int rc, j, qtype, qclass, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag;
767: unsigned long ttl, sig_ttl;
1.1 misho 768: struct blockdata *key;
1.1.1.3 misho 769: union all_addr a;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 770: int failflags = DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG | DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
1.1 misho 771:
772: if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
1.1.1.3 misho 773: RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL || RCODE(header) == REFUSED ||
1.1 misho 774: !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
1.1.1.4 ! misho 775: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
1.1 misho 776:
777: GETSHORT(qtype, p);
778: GETSHORT(qclass, p);
779:
1.1.1.2 misho 780: if (qtype != T_DNSKEY || qclass != class || ntohs(header->ancount) == 0)
1.1.1.4 ! misho 781: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
1.1 misho 782:
783: /* See if we have cached a DS record which validates this key */
784: if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_DS)))
785: {
786: strcpy(keyname, name);
787: return STAT_NEED_DS;
788: }
789:
790: /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
791: for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j--)
792: {
793: /* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
794: if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
795: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
796:
797: GETSHORT(qtype, p);
798: GETSHORT(qclass, p);
799: GETLONG(ttl, p);
800: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
801:
802: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen) || rdlen < 4)
803: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
804:
805: if (qclass != class || qtype != T_DNSKEY || rc == 2)
806: {
807: p += rdlen;
808: continue;
809: }
810:
811: psave = p;
812:
813: GETSHORT(flags, p);
814: if (*p++ != 3)
1.1.1.4 ! misho 815: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
1.1 misho 816: algo = *p++;
817: keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, p, rdlen - 4);
818: key = NULL;
819:
820: /* key must have zone key flag set */
821: if (flags & 0x100)
1.1.1.4 ! misho 822: {
! 823: key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4);
! 824: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE;
! 825: }
1.1 misho 826:
827: p = psave;
828:
829: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
830: {
831: if (key)
832: blockdata_free(key);
833: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
834: }
835:
836: /* No zone key flag or malloc failure */
837: if (!key)
838: continue;
839:
840: for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1, name, now, F_DS))
841: {
842: void *ctx;
843: unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest;
844: const struct nettle_hash *hash;
1.1.1.2 misho 845: int sigcnt, rrcnt;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 846: int wire_len;
! 847:
1.1 misho 848: if (recp1->addr.ds.algo == algo &&
849: recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
1.1.1.4 ! misho 850: recp1->uid == (unsigned int)class)
1.1 misho 851: {
1.1.1.4 ! misho 852: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
! 853:
! 854: if (!(hash = hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest))))
! 855: continue;
! 856: else
! 857: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP;
! 858:
! 859: if (!hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
! 860: continue;
! 861:
! 862: wire_len = to_wire(name);
1.1 misho 863:
864: /* Note that digest may be different between DSs, so
865: we can't move this outside the loop. */
866: hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char *)name);
867: hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)rdlen, psave);
868: hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
869:
870: from_wire(name);
871:
1.1.1.2 misho 872: if (!(recp1->flags & F_NEG) &&
873: recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size &&
1.1.1.3 misho 874: (ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1->addr.ds.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)) &&
1.1 misho 875: memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen) == 0 &&
1.1.1.2 misho 876: explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
1.1.1.4 ! misho 877: rrcnt != 0)
1.1 misho 878: {
1.1.1.4 ! misho 879: if (sigcnt == 0)
! 880: continue;
! 881: else
! 882: failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
! 883:
! 884: rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname,
! 885: NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag, &sig_ttl);
! 886:
! 887: failflags &= rc;
! 888:
! 889: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
! 890: {
! 891: valid = 1;
! 892: break;
! 893: }
1.1 misho 894: }
895: }
896: }
897: blockdata_free(key);
898: }
899:
900: if (valid)
901: {
1.1.1.2 misho 902: /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it. */
1.1 misho 903: cache_start_insert();
904:
905: p = skip_questions(header, plen);
906:
907: for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
908: {
909: /* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
910: if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
1.1.1.2 misho 911: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 912:
913: GETSHORT(qtype, p);
914: GETSHORT(qclass, p);
915: GETLONG(ttl, p);
916: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
1.1.1.3 misho 917:
918: /* TTL may be limited by sig. */
919: if (sig_ttl < ttl)
920: ttl = sig_ttl;
1.1 misho 921:
922: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
923: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
924:
925: if (qclass == class && rc == 1)
926: {
927: psave = p;
928:
929: if (qtype == T_DNSKEY)
930: {
931: if (rdlen < 4)
932: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
933:
934: GETSHORT(flags, p);
935: if (*p++ != 3)
936: return STAT_BOGUS;
937: algo = *p++;
938: keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, p, rdlen - 4);
939:
940: if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
941: {
1.1.1.3 misho 942: a.key.keylen = rdlen - 4;
943: a.key.keydata = key;
944: a.key.algo = algo;
945: a.key.keytag = keytag;
946: a.key.flags = flags;
947:
948: if (!cache_insert(name, &a, class, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DNSSECOK))
1.1.1.2 misho 949: {
950: blockdata_free(key);
951: return STAT_BOGUS;
952: }
1.1 misho 953: else
954: {
1.1.1.3 misho 955: a.log.keytag = keytag;
956: a.log.algo = algo;
957: if (algo_digest_name(algo))
1.1.1.4 ! misho 958: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %hu, algo %hu", 0);
1.1.1.2 misho 959: else
1.1.1.4 ! misho 960: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %hu, algo %hu (not supported)", 0);
1.1 misho 961: }
962: }
963: }
1.1.1.2 misho 964:
1.1 misho 965: p = psave;
966: }
967:
968: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
969: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
970: }
971:
972: /* commit cache insert. */
973: cache_end_insert();
1.1.1.2 misho 974: return STAT_OK;
1.1 misho 975: }
976:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 977: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DNSKEY", 0);
! 978: return STAT_BOGUS | failflags;
1.1 misho 979: }
980:
981: /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DS query
1.1.1.4 ! misho 982: Put all DSs in the answer which are valid and have hash and signature algos
! 983: we support into the cache.
1.1.1.2 misho 984: Also handles replies which prove that there's no DS at this location,
985: either because the zone is unsigned or this isn't a zone cut. These are
986: cached too.
1.1.1.4 ! misho 987: If none of the DS's are for supported algos, treat the answer as if
! 988: it's a proof of no DS at this location. RFC4035 para 5.2.
1.1 misho 989: return codes:
1.1.1.2 misho 990: STAT_OK At least one valid DS found and in cache.
991: STAT_BOGUS no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation, bad packet.
992: STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name in keyname
993: STAT_NEED_DS DS record needed.
1.1 misho 994: */
995:
996: int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
997: {
998: unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
1.1.1.4 ! misho 999: int qtype, qclass, rc, i, neganswer, nons, neg_ttl = 0, found_supported = 0;
! 1000: int aclass, atype, rdlen, flags;
1.1.1.2 misho 1001: unsigned long ttl;
1.1.1.3 misho 1002: union all_addr a;
1.1 misho 1003:
1004: if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
1005: !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
1006: return STAT_BOGUS;
1007:
1008: GETSHORT(qtype, p);
1009: GETSHORT(qclass, p);
1010:
1011: if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
1.1.1.2 misho 1012: rc = STAT_BOGUS;
1.1 misho 1013: else
1.1.1.3 misho 1014: rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname, NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons, &neg_ttl);
1.1 misho 1015:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1016: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE))
1.1.1.3 misho 1017: {
1018: my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("Insecure DS reply received for %s, check domain configuration and upstream DNS server DNSSEC support"), name);
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1019: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS - not secure", 0);
! 1020: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET;
1.1.1.3 misho 1021: }
1022:
1.1 misho 1023: p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1024: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
! 1025: return STAT_BOGUS;
! 1026:
1.1 misho 1027: p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
1028:
1.1.1.2 misho 1029: /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as the DS, we'll
1030: loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS answer comes
1031: from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1032: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) && hostname_isequal(name, keyname))
1.1.1.2 misho 1033: {
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1034: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS", 0);
1.1.1.2 misho 1035: return STAT_BOGUS;
1036: }
1.1 misho 1037:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1038: if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
1.1.1.2 misho 1039: return rc;
1040:
1041: if (!neganswer)
1.1 misho 1042: {
1.1.1.2 misho 1043: cache_start_insert();
1044:
1045: for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
1046: {
1047: if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
1048: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1049:
1050: GETSHORT(atype, p);
1051: GETSHORT(aclass, p);
1052: GETLONG(ttl, p);
1053: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
1054:
1055: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1056: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1057:
1058: if (aclass == class && atype == T_DS && rc == 1)
1059: {
1060: int algo, digest, keytag;
1061: unsigned char *psave = p;
1062: struct blockdata *key;
1.1.1.3 misho 1063:
1.1.1.2 misho 1064: if (rdlen < 4)
1065: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1066:
1067: GETSHORT(keytag, p);
1068: algo = *p++;
1069: digest = *p++;
1070:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1071: if (!ds_digest_name(digest) || !algo_digest_name(algo))
! 1072: {
! 1073: a.log.keytag = keytag;
! 1074: a.log.algo = algo;
! 1075: a.log.digest = digest;
! 1076: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu (not supported)", 0);
! 1077: neg_ttl = ttl;
! 1078: }
! 1079: else if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
1.1.1.2 misho 1080: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1081: a.ds.digest = digest;
1082: a.ds.keydata = key;
1083: a.ds.algo = algo;
1084: a.ds.keytag = keytag;
1085: a.ds.keylen = rdlen - 4;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1086:
1.1.1.3 misho 1087: if (!cache_insert(name, &a, class, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK))
1.1.1.2 misho 1088: {
1089: blockdata_free(key);
1090: return STAT_BOGUS;
1091: }
1092: else
1093: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1094: a.log.keytag = keytag;
1095: a.log.algo = algo;
1096: a.log.digest = digest;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1097: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu", 0);
! 1098: found_supported = 1;
1.1.1.2 misho 1099: }
1100: }
1101:
1102: p = psave;
1103: }
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1104:
1.1.1.2 misho 1105: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1106: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1107: }
1.1 misho 1108:
1.1.1.2 misho 1109: cache_end_insert();
1110:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1111: /* Fall through if no supported algo DS found. */
! 1112: if (found_supported)
! 1113: return STAT_OK;
1.1.1.2 misho 1114: }
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1115:
! 1116: flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
! 1117:
! 1118: if (neganswer)
1.1.1.2 misho 1119: {
1.1 misho 1120: if (RCODE(header) == NXDOMAIN)
1121: flags |= F_NXDOMAIN;
1122:
1.1.1.2 misho 1123: /* We only cache validated DS records, DNSSECOK flag hijacked
1124: to store presence/absence of NS. */
1125: if (nons)
1126: flags &= ~F_DNSSECOK;
1.1 misho 1127: }
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1128:
! 1129: cache_start_insert();
! 1130:
! 1131: /* Use TTL from NSEC for negative cache entries */
! 1132: if (!cache_insert(name, NULL, class, now, neg_ttl, flags))
! 1133: return STAT_BOGUS;
! 1134:
! 1135: cache_end_insert();
! 1136:
! 1137: if (neganswer)
! 1138: log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, nons ? "no DS/cut" : "no DS", 0);
1.1.1.2 misho 1139:
1140: return STAT_OK;
1.1 misho 1141: }
1142:
1.1.1.2 misho 1143:
1.1 misho 1144: /* 4034 6.1 */
1145: static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
1146: {
1147: char *sa, *ea, *ca, *sb, *eb, *cb;
1148: unsigned char ac, bc;
1149:
1150: sa = ea = (char *)a + strlen(a);
1151: sb = eb = (char *)b + strlen(b);
1152:
1153: while (1)
1154: {
1155: while (sa != a && *(sa-1) != '.')
1156: sa--;
1157:
1158: while (sb != b && *(sb-1) != '.')
1159: sb--;
1160:
1161: ca = sa;
1162: cb = sb;
1163:
1164: while (1)
1165: {
1166: if (ca == ea)
1167: {
1168: if (cb == eb)
1169: break;
1170:
1171: return -1;
1172: }
1173:
1174: if (cb == eb)
1175: return 1;
1176:
1177: ac = (unsigned char) *ca++;
1178: bc = (unsigned char) *cb++;
1179:
1180: if (ac >= 'A' && ac <= 'Z')
1181: ac += 'a' - 'A';
1182: if (bc >= 'A' && bc <= 'Z')
1183: bc += 'a' - 'A';
1184:
1185: if (ac < bc)
1186: return -1;
1187: else if (ac != bc)
1188: return 1;
1189: }
1190:
1191:
1192: if (sa == a)
1193: {
1194: if (sb == b)
1195: return 0;
1196:
1197: return -1;
1198: }
1199:
1200: if (sb == b)
1201: return 1;
1202:
1.1.1.2 misho 1203: ea = --sa;
1204: eb = --sb;
1.1 misho 1205: }
1206: }
1207:
1.1.1.3 misho 1208: static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count,
1209: char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
1.1 misho 1210: {
1211: int i, rc, rdlen;
1212: unsigned char *p, *psave;
1213: int offset = (type & 0xff) >> 3;
1214: int mask = 0x80 >> (type & 0x07);
1.1.1.2 misho 1215:
1216: if (nons)
1217: *nons = 1;
1.1 misho 1218:
1219: /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
1220: for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
1221: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1222: char *workspace1 = workspace1_in;
1223: int sig_labels, name_labels;
1224:
1.1 misho 1225: p = nsecs[i];
1226: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
1.1.1.2 misho 1227: return 0;
1.1 misho 1228: p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
1229: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
1230: psave = p;
1231: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
1.1.1.2 misho 1232: return 0;
1.1.1.3 misho 1233:
1234: /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
1235: as name for computation. */
1236: sig_labels = *labels[i];
1237: name_labels = count_labels(workspace1);
1238:
1239: if (sig_labels < name_labels)
1240: {
1241: int k;
1242: for (k = name_labels - sig_labels; k != 0; k--)
1243: {
1244: while (*workspace1 != '.' && *workspace1 != 0)
1245: workspace1++;
1246: if (k != 1 && *workspace1 == '.')
1247: workspace1++;
1248: }
1249:
1250: workspace1--;
1251: *workspace1 = '*';
1252: }
1253:
1.1 misho 1254: rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
1255:
1256: if (rc == 0)
1257: {
1258: /* 4035 para 5.4. Last sentence */
1259: if (type == T_NSEC || type == T_RRSIG)
1.1.1.2 misho 1260: return 1;
1.1 misho 1261:
1262: /* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check
1263: that the type in question doesn't appear in the type map */
1264: rdlen -= p - psave;
1265: /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it */
1266:
1.1.1.2 misho 1267: /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
1268: if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
1269: *nons = 0;
1270:
1271: if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
1272: {
1273: /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's a CNAME is should
1274: have been returned. */
1275: if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
1276: return 0;
1277:
1278: /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we have the
1.1.1.3 misho 1279: DS from the wrong side of the delegation. For the root DS,
1280: this is expected. */
1281: if (name_labels != 0 && type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
1.1.1.2 misho 1282: return 0;
1283: }
1284:
1.1 misho 1285: while (rdlen >= 2)
1286: {
1287: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1.1.1.2 misho 1288: return 0;
1.1 misho 1289:
1290: if (p[0] == type >> 8)
1291: {
1292: /* Does the NSEC say our type exists? */
1293: if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
1.1.1.2 misho 1294: return 0;
1.1 misho 1295:
1.1.1.3 misho 1296: break; /* finished checking */
1.1 misho 1297: }
1298:
1299: rdlen -= p[1];
1300: p += p[1];
1301: }
1302:
1.1.1.2 misho 1303: return 1;
1.1 misho 1304: }
1305: else if (rc == -1)
1306: {
1307: /* Normal case, name falls between NSEC name and next domain name,
1308: wrap around case, name falls between NSEC name (rc == -1) and end */
1.1.1.2 misho 1309: if (hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >= 0 || hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0)
1310: return 1;
1.1 misho 1311: }
1312: else
1313: {
1314: /* wrap around case, name falls between start and next domain name */
1.1.1.2 misho 1315: if (hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0 && hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >=0 )
1316: return 1;
1.1 misho 1317: }
1318: }
1319:
1.1.1.2 misho 1320: return 0;
1.1 misho 1321: }
1322:
1323: /* return digest length, or zero on error */
1324: static int hash_name(char *in, unsigned char **out, struct nettle_hash const *hash,
1325: unsigned char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations)
1326: {
1327: void *ctx;
1328: unsigned char *digest;
1329: int i;
1330:
1331: if (!hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
1332: return 0;
1333:
1334: hash->update(ctx, to_wire(in), (unsigned char *)in);
1335: hash->update(ctx, salt_len, salt);
1336: hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
1337:
1338: for(i = 0; i < iterations; i++)
1339: {
1340: hash->update(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
1341: hash->update(ctx, salt_len, salt);
1342: hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
1343: }
1344:
1345: from_wire(in);
1346:
1347: *out = digest;
1348: return hash->digest_size;
1349: }
1350:
1351: /* Decode base32 to first "." or end of string */
1352: static int base32_decode(char *in, unsigned char *out)
1353: {
1354: int oc, on, c, mask, i;
1355: unsigned char *p = out;
1356:
1357: for (c = *in, oc = 0, on = 0; c != 0 && c != '.'; c = *++in)
1358: {
1359: if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
1360: c -= '0';
1361: else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'v')
1362: c -= 'a', c += 10;
1363: else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'V')
1364: c -= 'A', c += 10;
1365: else
1366: return 0;
1367:
1368: for (mask = 0x10, i = 0; i < 5; i++)
1369: {
1370: if (c & mask)
1371: oc |= 1;
1372: mask = mask >> 1;
1373: if (((++on) & 7) == 0)
1374: *p++ = oc;
1375: oc = oc << 1;
1376: }
1377: }
1378:
1379: if ((on & 7) != 0)
1380: return 0;
1381:
1382: return p - out;
1383: }
1384:
1.1.1.2 misho 1385: static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int digest_len, unsigned char *digest, int type,
1.1.1.3 misho 1386: char *workspace1, char *workspace2, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, int *nons, int name_labels)
1.1.1.2 misho 1387: {
1388: int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen, flags;
1389: unsigned char *p, *psave;
1390:
1391: for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
1392: if ((p = nsecs[i]))
1393: {
1394: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0) ||
1395: !(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
1396: return 0;
1397:
1398: p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
1399: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
1400: psave = p;
1401: p++; /* algo */
1402: flags = *p++; /* flags */
1403: p += 2; /* iterations */
1404: salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */
1405: p += salt_len; /* salt */
1406: hash_len = *p++; /* p now points to next hashed name */
1407:
1408: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, hash_len))
1409: return 0;
1410:
1411: if (digest_len == base32_len && hash_len == base32_len)
1412: {
1413: int rc = memcmp(workspace2, digest, digest_len);
1414:
1415: if (rc == 0)
1416: {
1417: /* We found an NSEC3 whose hashed name exactly matches the query, so
1418: we just need to check the type map. p points to the RR data for the record. */
1419:
1420: int offset = (type & 0xff) >> 3;
1421: int mask = 0x80 >> (type & 0x07);
1422:
1423: p += hash_len; /* skip next-domain hash */
1424: rdlen -= p - psave;
1425:
1426: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1427: return 0;
1428:
1429: if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
1430: {
1431: /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
1432: if (nons && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
1433: *nons = 0;
1434:
1435: /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's a CNAME is should
1436: have been returned. */
1437: if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
1438: return 0;
1439:
1440: /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we have the
1.1.1.3 misho 1441: DS from the wrong side of the delegation. For the root DS,
1442: this is expected. */
1443: if (name_labels != 0 && type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
1.1.1.2 misho 1444: return 0;
1445: }
1446:
1447: while (rdlen >= 2)
1448: {
1449: if (p[0] == type >> 8)
1450: {
1451: /* Does the NSEC3 say our type exists? */
1452: if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
1453: return 0;
1454:
1.1.1.3 misho 1455: break; /* finished checking */
1.1.1.2 misho 1456: }
1457:
1458: rdlen -= p[1];
1459: p += p[1];
1460: }
1461:
1462: return 1;
1463: }
1464: else if (rc < 0)
1465: {
1466: /* Normal case, hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash and next domain name-hash,
1467: wrap around case, name-hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash and end */
1468: if (memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0 || memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0)
1469: {
1470: if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
1471: *nons = 0;
1472:
1473: return 1;
1474: }
1475: }
1476: else
1477: {
1478: /* wrap around case, name falls between start and next domain name */
1479: if (memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0 && memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0)
1480: {
1481: if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
1482: *nons = 0;
1483:
1484: return 1;
1485: }
1486: }
1487: }
1488: }
1489:
1490: return 0;
1491: }
1492:
1.1 misho 1493: static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
1.1.1.2 misho 1494: char *workspace1, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, char *wildname, int *nons)
1.1 misho 1495: {
1496: unsigned char *salt, *p, *digest;
1.1.1.2 misho 1497: int digest_len, i, iterations, salt_len, base32_len, algo = 0;
1.1 misho 1498: struct nettle_hash const *hash;
1499: char *closest_encloser, *next_closest, *wildcard;
1.1.1.2 misho 1500:
1501: if (nons)
1502: *nons = 1;
1503:
1.1 misho 1504: /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with
1.1.1.2 misho 1505: an algorithm we support.
1.1 misho 1506:
1507: Take the algo, iterations, and salt of that record
1508: as the ones we're going to use, and prune any
1509: that don't match. */
1510:
1511: for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
1512: {
1513: if (!(p = skip_name(nsecs[i], header, plen, 15)))
1.1.1.2 misho 1514: return 0; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 1515:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1516: p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
1.1 misho 1517: algo = *p++;
1518:
1.1.1.2 misho 1519: if ((hash = hash_find(nsec3_digest_name(algo))))
1.1 misho 1520: break; /* known algo */
1521: }
1522:
1523: /* No usable NSEC3s */
1524: if (i == nsec_count)
1.1.1.2 misho 1525: return 0;
1.1 misho 1526:
1527: p++; /* flags */
1.1.1.2 misho 1528:
1.1 misho 1529: GETSHORT (iterations, p);
1.1.1.2 misho 1530: /* Upper-bound iterations, to avoid DoS.
1531: Strictly, there are lower bounds for small keys, but
1532: since we don't have key size info here, at least limit
1533: to the largest bound, for 4096-bit keys. RFC 5155 10.3 */
1534: if (iterations > 2500)
1535: return 0;
1536:
1.1 misho 1537: salt_len = *p++;
1538: salt = p;
1539: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, salt, plen, salt_len))
1.1.1.2 misho 1540: return 0; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 1541:
1542: /* Now prune so we only have NSEC3 records with same iterations, salt and algo */
1543: for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
1544: {
1545: unsigned char *nsec3p = nsecs[i];
1.1.1.2 misho 1546: int this_iter, flags;
1.1 misho 1547:
1548: nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
1549:
1550: if (!(p = skip_name(nsec3p, header, plen, 15)))
1.1.1.2 misho 1551: return 0; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 1552:
1553: p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
1554:
1555: if (*p++ != algo)
1556: continue;
1557:
1.1.1.2 misho 1558: flags = *p++; /* flags */
1.1 misho 1559:
1.1.1.2 misho 1560: /* 5155 8.2 */
1561: if (flags != 0 && flags != 1)
1562: continue;
1563:
1.1 misho 1564: GETSHORT(this_iter, p);
1565: if (this_iter != iterations)
1566: continue;
1567:
1568: if (salt_len != *p++)
1569: continue;
1570:
1571: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, salt_len))
1.1.1.2 misho 1572: return 0; /* bad packet */
1.1 misho 1573:
1574: if (memcmp(p, salt, salt_len) != 0)
1575: continue;
1576:
1577: /* All match, put the pointer back */
1578: nsecs[i] = nsec3p;
1579: }
1580:
1.1.1.2 misho 1581: if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
1582: return 0;
1583:
1.1.1.3 misho 1584: if (check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, nons, count_labels(name)))
1.1.1.2 misho 1585: return 1;
1.1 misho 1586:
1.1.1.2 misho 1587: /* Can't find an NSEC3 which covers the name directly, we need the "closest encloser NSEC3"
1588: or an answer inferred from a wildcard record. */
1.1 misho 1589: closest_encloser = name;
1590: next_closest = NULL;
1591:
1592: do
1593: {
1594: if (*closest_encloser == '.')
1595: closest_encloser++;
1596:
1.1.1.2 misho 1597: if (wildname && hostname_isequal(closest_encloser, wildname))
1598: break;
1599:
1.1 misho 1600: if ((digest_len = hash_name(closest_encloser, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
1.1.1.2 misho 1601: return 0;
1.1 misho 1602:
1603: for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
1604: if ((p = nsecs[i]))
1605: {
1606: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0) ||
1607: !(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
1.1.1.2 misho 1608: return 0;
1.1 misho 1609:
1610: if (digest_len == base32_len &&
1611: memcmp(digest, workspace2, digest_len) == 0)
1612: break; /* Gotit */
1613: }
1614:
1615: if (i != nsec_count)
1616: break;
1617:
1618: next_closest = closest_encloser;
1619: }
1620: while ((closest_encloser = strchr(closest_encloser, '.')));
1621:
1.1.1.2 misho 1622: if (!closest_encloser || !next_closest)
1623: return 0;
1624:
1625: /* Look for NSEC3 that proves the non-existence of the next-closest encloser */
1626: if ((digest_len = hash_name(next_closest, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
1627: return 0;
1628:
1.1.1.3 misho 1629: if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL, 1))
1.1.1.2 misho 1630: return 0;
1.1 misho 1631:
1.1.1.2 misho 1632: /* Finally, check that there's no seat of wildcard synthesis */
1633: if (!wildname)
1.1 misho 1634: {
1.1.1.2 misho 1635: if (!(wildcard = strchr(next_closest, '.')) || wildcard == next_closest)
1636: return 0;
1.1 misho 1637:
1.1.1.2 misho 1638: wildcard--;
1639: *wildcard = '*';
1640:
1641: if ((digest_len = hash_name(wildcard, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
1642: return 0;
1643:
1.1.1.3 misho 1644: if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL, 1))
1.1.1.2 misho 1645: return 0;
1646: }
1647:
1648: return 1;
1649: }
1650:
1.1.1.3 misho 1651: static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char *wildname, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl)
1.1.1.2 misho 1652: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1653: static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL, **rrsig_labels = NULL;
1654: static int nsecset_sz = 0, rrsig_labels_sz = 0;
1.1.1.2 misho 1655:
1656: int type_found = 0;
1.1.1.3 misho 1657: unsigned char *auth_start, *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
1.1.1.2 misho 1658: int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
1.1.1.3 misho 1659: unsigned long ttl;
1.1.1.2 misho 1660:
1661: /* Move to NS section */
1662: if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
1663: return 0;
1.1.1.3 misho 1664:
1665: auth_start = p;
1.1.1.2 misho 1666:
1.1.1.3 misho 1667: for (nsecs_found = 0, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
1.1.1.2 misho 1668: {
1669: unsigned char *pstart = p;
1670:
1.1.1.3 misho 1671: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
1.1.1.2 misho 1672: return 0;
1.1.1.3 misho 1673:
1.1.1.2 misho 1674: GETSHORT(type, p);
1675: GETSHORT(class, p);
1.1.1.3 misho 1676: GETLONG(ttl, p);
1.1.1.2 misho 1677: GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
1678:
1679: if (class == qclass && (type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3))
1.1 misho 1680: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1681: if (nsec_ttl)
1682: {
1683: /* Limit TTL with sig TTL */
1684: if (daemon->rr_status[ntohs(header->ancount) + i] < ttl)
1685: ttl = daemon->rr_status[ntohs(header->ancount) + i];
1686: *nsec_ttl = ttl;
1687: }
1688:
1.1.1.2 misho 1689: /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
1690: if (type_found != 0 && type_found != type)
1691: return 0;
1692:
1693: type_found = type;
1694:
1695: if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found))
1696: return 0;
1.1 misho 1697:
1.1.1.3 misho 1698: if (type == T_NSEC)
1699: {
1700: /* If we're looking for NSECs, find the corresponding SIGs, to
1701: extract the labels value, which we need in case the NSECs
1702: are the result of wildcard expansion.
1703: Note that the NSEC may not have been validated yet
1704: so if there are multiple SIGs, make sure the label value
1705: is the same in all, to avoid be duped by a rogue one.
1706: If there are no SIGs, that's an error */
1707: unsigned char *p1 = auth_start;
1708: int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1;
1709:
1710: if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_found))
1711: return 0;
1712:
1713: rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = NULL;
1714:
1715: for (j = ntohs(header->nscount); j != 0; j--)
1716: {
1717: if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
1718: return 0;
1719:
1720: GETSHORT(type1, p1);
1721: GETSHORT(class1, p1);
1722: p1 += 4; /* TTL */
1723: GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
1724:
1725: if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
1726: return 0;
1727:
1728: if (res == 1 && class1 == qclass && type1 == T_RRSIG)
1729: {
1730: int type_covered;
1731: unsigned char *psav = p1;
1732:
1733: if (rdlen1 < 18)
1734: return 0; /* bad packet */
1735:
1736: GETSHORT(type_covered, p1);
1737:
1738: if (type_covered == T_NSEC)
1739: {
1740: p1++; /* algo */
1741:
1742: /* labels field must be the same in every SIG we find. */
1743: if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
1744: rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = p1;
1745: else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] != *p1) /* algo */
1746: return 0;
1747: }
1748: p1 = psav;
1749: }
1750:
1751: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
1752: return 0;
1753: }
1754:
1755: /* Must have found at least one sig. */
1756: if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
1757: return 0;
1758: }
1759:
1760: nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
1.1.1.2 misho 1761: }
1762:
1763: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
1764: return 0;
1765: }
1766:
1767: if (type_found == T_NSEC)
1.1.1.3 misho 1768: return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labels, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
1.1.1.2 misho 1769: else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
1770: return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons);
1771: else
1772: return 0;
1773: }
1774:
1775: /* Check signing status of name.
1776: returns:
1777: STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
1778: STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
1779: STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
1780: STAT_NEED_KEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in keyname.
1781: name returned unaltered.
1782: */
1783: static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t now)
1784: {
1785: int name_start = strlen(name); /* for when TA is root */
1786: struct crec *crecp;
1787: char *p;
1788:
1789: /* First, work towards the root, looking for a trust anchor.
1790: This can either be one configured, or one previously cached.
1791: We can assume, if we don't find one first, that there is
1792: a trust anchor at the root. */
1793: for (p = name; p; p = strchr(p, '.'))
1794: {
1795: if (*p == '.')
1796: p++;
1797:
1798: if (cache_find_by_name(NULL, p, now, F_DS))
1799: {
1800: name_start = p - name;
1801: break;
1802: }
1803: }
1804:
1805: /* Now work away from the trust anchor */
1806: while (1)
1807: {
1808: strcpy(keyname, &name[name_start]);
1809:
1810: if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
1811: return STAT_NEED_DS;
1812:
1.1.1.3 misho 1813: /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existence of NS record.
1.1.1.2 misho 1814: F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved there's no DS record here,
1815: but that's because there's no NS record either, ie this isn't the start
1816: of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below a node is unsigned when
1817: we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no DS record. */
1818: if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
1819: {
1820: if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
1821: return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
1822: }
1823: else
1824: {
1825: /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we don't support,
1826: then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
1827: appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
1828: exist for each RRset: 4035 para 2.2 So if we find
1829: a DS here with digest and sig we can do, we're entitled
1830: to assume we can validate the zone and if we can't later,
1831: because an RRSIG is missing we return BOGUS.
1832: */
1833: do
1.1 misho 1834: {
1.1.1.2 misho 1835: if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
1.1.1.3 misho 1836: ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) &&
1837: algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
1.1.1.2 misho 1838: break;
1.1 misho 1839: }
1.1.1.2 misho 1840: while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now, F_DS)));
1841:
1842: if (!crecp)
1843: return STAT_INSECURE;
1.1 misho 1844: }
1.1.1.2 misho 1845:
1846: if (name_start == 0)
1847: break;
1848:
1849: for (p = &name[name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p != name); p--);
1.1 misho 1850:
1.1.1.2 misho 1851: if (p != name)
1852: p++;
1853:
1854: name_start = p - name;
1855: }
1.1 misho 1856:
1.1.1.2 misho 1857: return STAT_SECURE;
1858: }
1859:
1860: /* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of the reply (4035:3.2.3)
1861: Return code:
1862: STAT_SECURE if it validates.
1863: STAT_INSECURE at least one RRset not validated, because in unsigned zone.
1864: STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation where there should be.
1865: STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname, class in *class)
1.1.1.3 misho 1866: STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
1867:
1868: daemon->rr_status points to a char array which corressponds to the RRs in the
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1869: answer and auth sections. This is set to >1 for each RR which is validated, and 0 for any which aren't.
1.1.1.3 misho 1870:
1871: When validating replies to DS records, we're only interested in the NSEC{3} RRs in the auth section.
1872: Other RRs in that section missing sigs will not cause am INSECURE reply. We determine this mode
1873: is the nons argument is non-NULL.
1.1.1.2 misho 1874: */
1875: int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname,
1.1.1.3 misho 1876: int *class, int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl)
1.1.1.2 misho 1877: {
1878: static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
1879: static int target_sz = 0;
1.1 misho 1880:
1.1.1.2 misho 1881: unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2;
1.1.1.3 misho 1882: int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx;
1883: int i, j, rc = STAT_INSECURE;
1884: int secure = STAT_SECURE;
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1885:
1.1.1.3 misho 1886: /* extend rr_status if necessary */
1887: if (daemon->rr_status_sz < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount))
1888: {
1889: unsigned long *new = whine_malloc(sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * (ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + 64));
1890:
1891: if (!new)
1892: return STAT_BOGUS;
1.1.1.2 misho 1893:
1.1.1.3 misho 1894: free(daemon->rr_status);
1895: daemon->rr_status = new;
1896: daemon->rr_status_sz = ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + 64;
1897: }
1898:
1899: memset(daemon->rr_status, 0, sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * daemon->rr_status_sz);
1900:
1.1.1.2 misho 1901: if (neganswer)
1902: *neganswer = 0;
1.1 misho 1903:
1.1.1.2 misho 1904: if (RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL || ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1)
1.1 misho 1905: return STAT_BOGUS;
1906:
1.1.1.2 misho 1907: if (RCODE(header) != NXDOMAIN && RCODE(header) != NOERROR)
1908: return STAT_INSECURE;
1909:
1910: p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
1.1 misho 1911:
1.1.1.2 misho 1912: /* Find all the targets we're looking for answers to.
1913: The zeroth array element is for the query, subsequent ones
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1914: for CNAME targets, unless the query is for a CNAME or ANY. */
1.1.1.2 misho 1915:
1916: if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, 0))
1.1 misho 1917: return STAT_BOGUS;
1918:
1.1.1.2 misho 1919: targets[0] = p1;
1920: targetidx = 1;
1921:
1.1 misho 1922: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
1923: return STAT_BOGUS;
1.1.1.2 misho 1924:
1.1 misho 1925: GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
1926: GETSHORT(qclass, p1);
1927: ans_start = p1;
1928:
1.1.1.2 misho 1929: /* Can't validate an RRSIG query */
1.1 misho 1930: if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
1931: return STAT_INSECURE;
1.1.1.2 misho 1932:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 1933: if (qtype != T_CNAME && qtype != T_ANY)
1.1.1.2 misho 1934: for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
1935: {
1936: if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
1937: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1938:
1939: GETSHORT(type2, p1);
1940: p1 += 6; /* class, TTL */
1941: GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);
1942:
1943: if (type2 == T_CNAME)
1944: {
1945: if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
1946: return STAT_BOGUS;
1947:
1948: targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
1949: }
1950:
1951: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
1952: return STAT_BOGUS;
1953: }
1.1 misho 1954:
1955: for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
1956: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1957: if (i != 0 && !ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
1958: return STAT_BOGUS;
1959:
1.1 misho 1960: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
1961: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1962:
1963: GETSHORT(type1, p1);
1964: GETSHORT(class1, p1);
1965: p1 += 4; /* TTL */
1966: GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
1967:
1968: /* Don't try and validate RRSIGs! */
1.1.1.3 misho 1969: if (type1 == T_RRSIG)
1970: continue;
1971:
1972: /* Check if we've done this RRset already */
1973: for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < i; j++)
1.1 misho 1974: {
1.1.1.3 misho 1975: if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
1976: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
1977:
1978: GETSHORT(type2, p2);
1979: GETSHORT(class2, p2);
1980: p2 += 4; /* TTL */
1981: GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
1.1 misho 1982:
1.1.1.3 misho 1983: if (type2 == type1 && class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
1984: break; /* Done it before: name, type, class all match. */
1985:
1986: if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
1987: return STAT_BOGUS;
1988: }
1989:
1990: /* Done already: copy the validation status */
1991: if (j != i)
1992: daemon->rr_status[i] = daemon->rr_status[j];
1993: else
1994: {
1.1 misho 1995: /* Not done, validate now */
1.1.1.3 misho 1996: int sigcnt, rrcnt;
1997: char *wildname;
1998:
1999: if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
2000: return STAT_BOGUS;
2001:
2002: /* No signatures for RRset. We can be configured to assume this is OK and return an INSECURE result. */
2003: if (sigcnt == 0)
1.1 misho 2004: {
1.1.1.3 misho 2005: /* NSEC and NSEC3 records must be signed. We make this assumption elsewhere. */
2006: if (type1 == T_NSEC || type1 == T_NSEC3)
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2007: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
1.1.1.3 misho 2008: else if (nons && i >= ntohs(header->ancount))
2009: /* If we're validating a DS reply, rather than looking for the value of AD bit,
2010: we only care that NSEC and NSEC3 RRs in the auth section are signed.
2011: Return SECURE even if others (SOA....) are not. */
2012: rc = STAT_SECURE;
2013: else
1.1 misho 2014: {
1.1.1.3 misho 2015: /* unsigned RRsets in auth section are not BOGUS, but do make reply insecure. */
2016: if (check_unsigned && i < ntohs(header->ancount))
1.1.1.2 misho 2017: {
2018: rc = zone_status(name, class1, keyname, now);
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2019: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
! 2020: rc = STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
! 2021:
1.1.1.3 misho 2022: if (class)
2023: *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY */
1.1.1.2 misho 2024: }
2025: else
2026: rc = STAT_INSECURE;
1.1 misho 2027:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2028: if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE))
1.1.1.3 misho 2029: return rc;
1.1.1.2 misho 2030: }
1.1.1.3 misho 2031: }
2032: else
2033: {
1.1.1.2 misho 2034: /* explore_rrset() gives us key name from sigs in keyname.
2035: Can't overwrite name here. */
2036: strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
2037: rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1, keyname, now);
1.1 misho 2038:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2039: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS))
1.1 misho 2040: {
1.1.1.2 misho 2041: if (class)
1.1.1.3 misho 2042: *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY */
1.1.1.2 misho 2043: return rc;
1.1.1.3 misho 2044: }
2045:
2046: /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset */
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2047: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
1.1.1.2 misho 2048: {
1.1.1.3 misho 2049: unsigned long sig_ttl;
2050: rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1, sigcnt,
2051: rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0, &sig_ttl);
2052:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2053: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS))
1.1.1.3 misho 2054: {
2055: if (class)
2056: *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
2057: return rc;
2058: }
2059:
1.1.1.2 misho 2060: /* rc is now STAT_SECURE or STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD */
1.1.1.3 misho 2061:
2062: /* Note that RR is validated */
2063: daemon->rr_status[i] = sig_ttl;
2064:
1.1.1.2 misho 2065: /* Note if we've validated either the answer to the question
2066: or the target of a CNAME. Any not noted will need NSEC or
2067: to be in unsigned space. */
2068: for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
2069: if ((p2 = targets[j]))
2070: {
1.1.1.3 misho 2071: int rc1;
2072: if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
1.1.1.2 misho 2073: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
2074:
1.1.1.3 misho 2075: if (class1 == qclass && rc1 == 1 && (type1 == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
1.1.1.2 misho 2076: targets[j] = NULL;
2077: }
1.1.1.3 misho 2078:
2079: /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a different
2080: answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
2081: hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
2082: the genuine record doesn't exist. Check that here.
2083: Note that we may not yet have validated the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets.
2084: That's not a problem since if the RRsets later fail
2085: we'll return BOGUS then. */
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2086: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD) &&
1.1.1.3 misho 2087: !prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1, wildname, NULL, NULL))
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2088: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
1.1.1.3 misho 2089:
2090: rc = STAT_SECURE;
1.1 misho 2091: }
2092: }
2093: }
2094:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2095: if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE))
1.1.1.3 misho 2096: secure = STAT_INSECURE;
1.1 misho 2097: }
2098:
1.1.1.2 misho 2099: /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a missing answer or CNAME target. */
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2100: for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
! 2101: if ((p2 = targets[j]))
! 2102: {
! 2103: if (neganswer)
! 2104: *neganswer = 1;
! 2105:
! 2106: if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
! 2107: return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
! 2108:
! 2109: /* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name, qclass, qtype) */
! 2110:
! 2111: /* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is OK if either
! 2112: the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC records. */
! 2113: if (!prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, qtype, qclass, NULL, nons, nsec_ttl))
! 2114: {
! 2115: /* Empty DS without NSECS */
! 2116: if (qtype == T_DS)
! 2117: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
! 2118:
! 2119: if (!STAT_ISEQUAL((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)), STAT_SECURE))
! 2120: {
! 2121: if (class)
! 2122: *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY */
! 2123: return rc;
! 2124: }
! 2125:
! 2126: return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
! 2127: }
! 2128: }
1.1 misho 2129:
1.1.1.3 misho 2130: return secure;
1.1 misho 2131: }
2132:
2133:
2134: /* Compute keytag (checksum to quickly index a key). See RFC4034 */
2135: int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *key, int keylen)
2136: {
2137: if (alg == 1)
2138: {
2139: /* Algorithm 1 (RSAMD5) has a different (older) keytag calculation algorithm.
2140: See RFC4034, Appendix B.1 */
2141: return key[keylen-4] * 256 + key[keylen-3];
2142: }
2143: else
2144: {
2145: unsigned long ac = flags + 0x300 + alg;
2146: int i;
2147:
2148: for (i = 0; i < keylen; ++i)
2149: ac += (i & 1) ? key[i] : key[i] << 8;
2150:
2151: ac += (ac >> 16) & 0xffff;
2152: return ac & 0xffff;
2153: }
2154: }
2155:
1.1.1.2 misho 2156: size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char *name, int class,
1.1.1.3 misho 2157: int type, int edns_pktsz)
1.1 misho 2158: {
2159: unsigned char *p;
1.1.1.2 misho 2160: size_t ret;
1.1 misho 2161:
2162: header->qdcount = htons(1);
2163: header->ancount = htons(0);
2164: header->nscount = htons(0);
2165: header->arcount = htons(0);
2166:
2167: header->hb3 = HB3_RD;
2168: SET_OPCODE(header, QUERY);
2169: /* For debugging, set Checking Disabled, otherwise, have the upstream check too,
2170: this allows it to select auth servers when one is returning bad data. */
2171: header->hb4 = option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG) ? HB4_CD : 0;
2172:
2173: /* ID filled in later */
2174:
2175: p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
2176:
1.1.1.3 misho 2177: p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, NULL);
1.1 misho 2178: *p++ = 0;
2179: PUTSHORT(type, p);
2180: PUTSHORT(class, p);
2181:
1.1.1.2 misho 2182: ret = add_do_bit(header, p - (unsigned char *)header, end);
1.1 misho 2183:
1.1.1.2 misho 2184: if (find_pseudoheader(header, ret, NULL, &p, NULL, NULL))
2185: PUTSHORT(edns_pktsz, p);
1.1 misho 2186:
1.1.1.2 misho 2187: return ret;
1.1 misho 2188: }
2189:
1.1.1.4 ! misho 2190: int errflags_to_ede(int status)
! 2191: {
! 2192: /* We can end up with more than one flag set for some errors,
! 2193: so this encodes a rough priority so the (eg) No sig is reported
! 2194: before no-unexpired-sig. */
! 2195:
! 2196: if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV)
! 2197: return EDE_SIG_NYV;
! 2198: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP)
! 2199: return EDE_SIG_EXP;
! 2200: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEYSUP)
! 2201: return EDE_USUPDNSKEY;
! 2202: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE)
! 2203: return EDE_NO_ZONEKEY;
! 2204: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY)
! 2205: return EDE_NO_DNSKEY;
! 2206: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP)
! 2207: return EDE_USUPDS;
! 2208: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC)
! 2209: return EDE_NO_NSEC;
! 2210: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET)
! 2211: return EDE_DNSSEC_IND;
! 2212: else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG)
! 2213: return EDE_NO_RRSIG;
! 2214: else
! 2215: return EDE_UNSET;
! 2216: }
1.1 misho 2217: #endif /* HAVE_DNSSEC */
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