Annotation of embedaddon/mtr/SECURITY, revision 1.1.1.3
1.1 misho 1: SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO MTR
2:
1.1.1.3 ! misho 3: mtr invokes a sub-process, mtr-packet, which requires extra privileges
! 4: to send custom packets, and there are security implications from
! 5: granting this.
! 6:
! 7: There are several different ways to provide the privileges:
! 8:
! 9: 1. Add limited privileges on systems that support this. (Preferred.)
! 10: 2. Run mtr as the root user.
! 11: 3. Make mtr-packet a setuid-root binary.
! 12:
! 13: Details:
! 14:
! 15: 1. Add limited privileges on systems that support this.
! 16:
! 17: Some operating systems allow binaries to be run with only the subset
! 18: of security privileges that are actually needed.
! 19:
! 20: Linux:
! 21: On Linux, privileges are known as capabilities. The only additional
! 22: capability that mtr-packet needs is cap_net_raw. To give this
! 23: capability to the mtr-packet binary, run the following command as root:
! 24:
! 25: # setcap cap_net_raw+ep mtr-packet
! 26:
! 27:
! 28: 2. Run mtr as the root user.
! 29:
1.1 misho 30: You can limit mtr usage to the root user by not putting a setuid bit
1.1.1.3 ! misho 31: on the mtr-packet binary. In that case, the security implications are
! 32: minimal.
1.1 misho 33:
34:
1.1.1.3 ! misho 35: 3. Make mtr-packet a setuid-root binary.
1.1 misho 36:
1.1.1.3 ! misho 37: The mtr-packet binary can be made setuid-root, which is what "make install"
! 38: does by default.
1.1 misho 39:
1.1.1.3 ! misho 40: When mtr-packet is installed as suid-root, some concern over security is
! 41: justified. mtr-packet does the following two things after it is launched:
1.1 misho 42:
1.1.1.3 ! misho 43: * mtr-packet open sockets for sending raw packets and for receiving
! 44: ICMP packets.
! 45: * mtr-packet drops root privileges by setting the effective uid to
! 46: match uid or the user calling mtr.
! 47: * If capabilities support is available, mtr-packet drops all privileged
! 48: capabilities.
1.1 misho 49:
1.1.1.3 ! misho 50: See main() in packet.c and init_net_state_privileged() in probe_unix.c
! 51: for the details of this process.
! 52:
! 53: This should limit the possibilities of using mtr to breach system security.
! 54: The worst case scenario is as follows:
! 55:
! 56: Due to some oversight in the mtr-packet code, a malicious user is able to
! 57: overrun one of mtr-packets's internal buffers with binary code that is
1.1 misho 58: eventually executed. The malicious user is still not able to read
1.1.1.3 ! misho 59: from or write to any system files other than those normally accessible
! 60: by the user running mtr. The only privileges gained are access to the raw
! 61: socket, which would allow the malicious user to listen to all ICMP packets
! 62: arriving at the system, and to send forged packets with arbitrary contents.
! 63:
1.1 misho 64:
65: If you have further questions or comments about security issues,
1.1.1.3 ! misho 66: please see the README file for details on how to submit them.
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