Annotation of embedaddon/mtr/SECURITY, revision 1.1.1.4
1.1 misho 1: SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO MTR
2:
1.1.1.3 misho 3: mtr invokes a sub-process, mtr-packet, which requires extra privileges
4: to send custom packets, and there are security implications from
5: granting this.
6:
7: There are several different ways to provide the privileges:
8:
9: 1. Add limited privileges on systems that support this. (Preferred.)
10: 2. Run mtr as the root user.
11: 3. Make mtr-packet a setuid-root binary.
12:
13: Details:
14:
15: 1. Add limited privileges on systems that support this.
16:
17: Some operating systems allow binaries to be run with only the subset
18: of security privileges that are actually needed.
19:
20: Linux:
21: On Linux, privileges are known as capabilities. The only additional
22: capability that mtr-packet needs is cap_net_raw. To give this
23: capability to the mtr-packet binary, run the following command as root:
24:
25: # setcap cap_net_raw+ep mtr-packet
26:
27:
28: 2. Run mtr as the root user.
29:
1.1 misho 30: You can limit mtr usage to the root user by not putting a setuid bit
1.1.1.3 misho 31: on the mtr-packet binary. In that case, the security implications are
32: minimal.
1.1 misho 33:
34:
1.1.1.3 misho 35: 3. Make mtr-packet a setuid-root binary.
1.1 misho 36:
1.1.1.3 misho 37: The mtr-packet binary can be made setuid-root, which is what "make install"
1.1.1.4 ! misho 38: does only if using setcap (above) fails. Using setcap is tried first.
1.1 misho 39:
1.1.1.3 misho 40: When mtr-packet is installed as suid-root, some concern over security is
41: justified. mtr-packet does the following two things after it is launched:
1.1 misho 42:
1.1.1.3 misho 43: * mtr-packet open sockets for sending raw packets and for receiving
44: ICMP packets.
45: * mtr-packet drops root privileges by setting the effective uid to
46: match uid or the user calling mtr.
47: * If capabilities support is available, mtr-packet drops all privileged
48: capabilities.
1.1 misho 49:
1.1.1.3 misho 50: See main() in packet.c and init_net_state_privileged() in probe_unix.c
51: for the details of this process.
52:
53: This should limit the possibilities of using mtr to breach system security.
54: The worst case scenario is as follows:
55:
56: Due to some oversight in the mtr-packet code, a malicious user is able to
57: overrun one of mtr-packets's internal buffers with binary code that is
1.1 misho 58: eventually executed. The malicious user is still not able to read
1.1.1.3 misho 59: from or write to any system files other than those normally accessible
60: by the user running mtr. The only privileges gained are access to the raw
61: socket, which would allow the malicious user to listen to all ICMP packets
62: arriving at the system, and to send forged packets with arbitrary contents.
63:
1.1 misho 64:
65: If you have further questions or comments about security issues,
1.1.1.3 misho 66: please see the README file for details on how to submit them.
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