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/*
 * Copyright (C) 2011-2015 Tobias Brunner
 * HSR Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
 * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
 * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
 * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
 * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
 * for more details.
 */

/**
 * @defgroup keymat_v2 keymat_v2
 * @{ @ingroup ikev2
 */

#ifndef KEYMAT_V2_H_
#define KEYMAT_V2_H_

#include <sa/keymat.h>
#include <collections/array.h>

typedef struct keymat_v2_t keymat_v2_t;

/**
 * Derivation and management of sensitive keying material, IKEv2 variant.
 */
struct keymat_v2_t {

	/**
	 * Implements keymat_t.
	 */
	keymat_t keymat;

	/**
	 * Derive keys for the IKE_SA.
	 *
	 * These keys are not handed out, but are used by the associated signers,
	 * crypters and authentication functions.
	 *
	 * @param proposal	selected algorithms
	 * @param dh		diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh()
	 * @param nonce_i	initiators nonce value
	 * @param nonce_r	responders nonce value
	 * @param id		IKE_SA identifier
	 * @param rekey_prf	PRF of old SA if rekeying, PRF_UNDEFINED otherwise
	 * @param rekey_sdk	SKd of old SA if rekeying
	 * @return			TRUE on success
	 */
	bool (*derive_ike_keys)(keymat_v2_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
							diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i,
							chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
							pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function,
							chunk_t rekey_skd);

	/**
	 * Derive SK_d, SK_pi and SK_pr after authentication using the given
	 * Postquantum Preshared Key and the previous values of these keys that
	 * were derived by derive_ike_keys().
	 *
	 * @param ppk		the postquantum preshared key
	 * @return			TRUE on success
	 */
	bool (*derive_ike_keys_ppk)(keymat_v2_t *this, chunk_t ppk);

	/**
	 * Derive keys for a CHILD_SA.
	 *
	 * The keys for the CHILD_SA are allocated in the integ and encr chunks.
	 * An implementation might hand out encrypted keys only, which are
	 * decrypted in the kernel before use.
	 * If no PFS is used for the CHILD_SA, dh can be NULL.
	 *
	 * @param proposal	selected algorithms
	 * @param dh		diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh(), or NULL
	 * @param nonce_i	initiators nonce value
	 * @param nonce_r	responders nonce value
	 * @param encr_i	chunk to write initiators encryption key to
	 * @param integ_i	chunk to write initiators integrity key to
	 * @param encr_r	chunk to write responders encryption key to
	 * @param integ_r	chunk to write responders integrity key to
	 * @return			TRUE on success
	 */
	bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v2_t *this,
							  proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
							  chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
							  chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
							  chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
	/**
	 * Get SKd to pass to derive_ikey_keys() during rekeying.
	 *
	 * @param skd		chunk to write SKd to (internal data)
	 * @return			PRF function to derive keymat
	 */
	pseudo_random_function_t (*get_skd)(keymat_v2_t *this, chunk_t *skd);

	/**
	 * Generate octets to use for authentication procedure (RFC4306 2.15).
	 *
	 * This method creates the plain octets and is usually signed by a private
	 * key. PSK and EAP authentication include a secret into the data, use
	 * the get_psk_sig() method instead.
	 *
	 * @param verify		TRUE to create for verification, FALSE to sign
	 * @param ike_sa_init	encoded ike_sa_init message
	 * @param nonce			nonce value
	 * @param ppk			optional postquantum preshared key
	 * @param id			identity
	 * @param reserved		reserved bytes of id_payload
	 * @param octests		chunk receiving allocated auth octets
	 * @param schemes		array containing signature schemes
	 * 						(signature_params_t*) in case they need to be
	 *						modified by the keymat implementation
	 * @return				TRUE if octets created successfully
	 */
	bool (*get_auth_octets)(keymat_v2_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
							chunk_t nonce, chunk_t ppk, identification_t *id,
							char reserved[3], chunk_t *octets,
							array_t *schemes);
	/**
	 * Build the shared secret signature used for PSK and EAP authentication.
	 *
	 * This method wraps the get_auth_octets() method and additionally
	 * includes the secret into the signature. If no secret is given, SK_p is
	 * used as secret (used for EAP methods without MSK).
	 *
	 * @param verify		TRUE to create for verification, FALSE to sign
	 * @param ike_sa_init	encoded ike_sa_init message
	 * @param nonce			nonce value
	 * @param secret		optional secret to include into signature
	 * @param ppk			optional postquantum preshared key
	 * @param id			identity
	 * @param reserved		reserved bytes of id_payload
	 * @param sign			chunk receiving allocated signature octets
	 * @return				TRUE if signature created successfully
	 */
	bool (*get_psk_sig)(keymat_v2_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
						chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, chunk_t ppk,
						identification_t *id, char reserved[3], chunk_t *sig);

	/**
	 * Add a hash algorithm supported by the peer for signature authentication.
	 *
	 * @param hash			hash algorithm
	 */
	void (*add_hash_algorithm)(keymat_v2_t *this, hash_algorithm_t hash);

	/**
	 * Check if a given hash algorithm is supported by the peer for signature
	 * authentication.
	 *
	 * @param hash			hash algorithm
	 * @return				TRUE if supported, FALSE otherwise
	 */
	bool (*hash_algorithm_supported)(keymat_v2_t *this, hash_algorithm_t hash);
};

/**
 * Create a keymat instance.
 *
 * @param initiator			TRUE if we are the initiator
 * @return					keymat instance
 */
keymat_v2_t *keymat_v2_create(bool initiator);

#endif /** KEYMAT_V2_H_ @}*/