connections { # }
Section defining IKE connection configurations.
Section defining IKE connection configurations.
The connections section defines IKE connection configurations, each in
its own subsections. In the keyword description below, the connection
is named _<conn>_, but an arbitrary yet unique connection name can be
chosen for each connection subsection.
connections.<conn> { # }
Section for an IKE connection named <conn>.
connections.<conn>.version = 0
IKE major version to use for connection.
IKE major version to use for connection. _1_ uses IKEv1 aka ISAKMP, _2_
uses IKEv2. A connection using the default of _0_ accepts both IKEv1
and IKEv2 as responder, and initiates the connection actively with IKEv2.
connections.<conn>.local_addrs = %any
Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated. Takes
single IPv4/IPv6 addresses, DNS names, CIDR subnets or IP address ranges.
As initiator, the first non-range/non-subnet is used to initiate the
connection from. As responder, the local destination address must match at
least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.
If FQDNs are assigned they are resolved every time a configuration lookup
is done. If DNS resolution times out, the lookup is delayed for that time.
connections.<conn>.remote_addrs = %any
Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated. Takes
single IPv4/IPv6 addresses, DNS names, CIDR subnets or IP address ranges.
As initiator, the first non-range/non-subnet is used to initiate the
connection to. As responder, the initiator source address must match at
least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.
If FQDNs are assigned they are resolved every time a configuration lookup
is done. If DNS resolution times out, the lookup is delayed for that time.
To initiate a connection, at least one specific address or DNS name must
be specified.
connections.<conn>.local_port = 500
Local UDP port for IKE communication.
Local UDP port for IKE communication. By default the port of the socket
backend is used, which is usually _500_. If port _500_ is used, automatic
IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.
Using a non-default local IKE port requires support from the socket backend
in use (socket-dynamic).
connections.<conn>.remote_port = 500
Remote UDP port for IKE communication.
Remote UDP port for IKE communication. If the default of port _500_ is used,
automatic IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.
connections.<conn>.proposals = default
Comma separated proposals to accept for IKE.
A proposal is a set of algorithms. For non-AEAD algorithms, this includes
for IKE an encryption algorithm, an integrity algorithm, a pseudo random
function and a Diffie-Hellman group. For AEAD algorithms, instead of
encryption and integrity algorithms, a combined algorithm is used.
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.
Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
for interoperability.
connections.<conn>.vips =
Virtual IPs to request in configuration payload / Mode Config.
Comma separated list of virtual IPs to request in IKEv2 configuration
payloads or IKEv1 Mode Config. The wildcard addresses _0.0.0.0_ and _::_
request an arbitrary address, specific addresses may be defined. The
responder may return a different address, though, or none at all.
connections.<conn>.aggressive = no
Use Aggressive Mode in IKEv1.
Enables Aggressive Mode instead of Main Mode with Identity Protection.
Aggressive Mode is considered less secure, because the ID and HASH
payloads are exchanged unprotected. This allows a passive attacker to
snoop peer identities, and even worse, start dictionary attacks on the
Preshared Key.
connections.<conn>.pull = yes
Set the Mode Config mode to use.
If the default of _yes_ is used, Mode Config works in pull mode, where
the initiator actively requests a virtual IP. With _no_, push mode is used,
where the responder pushes down a virtual IP to the initiating peer.
Push mode is currently supported for IKEv1, but not in IKEv2. It is used
by a few implementations only, pull mode is recommended.
connections.<conn>.dscp = 000000
Differentiated Services Field Codepoint to set on outgoing IKE packets (six
binary digits).
Differentiated Services Field Codepoint to set on outgoing IKE packets for
this connection. The value is a six digit binary encoded string specifying
the Codepoint to set, as defined in RFC 2474.
connections.<conn>.encap = no
Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads.
To enforce UDP encapsulation of ESP packets, the IKE daemon can fake the
NAT detection payloads. This makes the peer believe that NAT takes
place on the path, forcing it to encapsulate ESP packets in UDP.
Usually this is not required, but it can help to work around connectivity
issues with too restrictive intermediary firewalls.
connections.<conn>.mobike = yes
Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections.
Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections. MOBIKE is enabled by default on IKEv2
connections, and allows mobility of clients and multi-homing on servers by
migrating active IPsec tunnels.
Usually keeping MOBIKE enabled is unproblematic, as it is not used if the
peer does not indicate support for it. However, due to the design of MOBIKE,
IKEv2 always floats to port 4500 starting from the second exchange. Some
implementations don't like this behavior, hence it can be disabled.
connections.<conn>.dpd_delay = 0s
Interval of liveness checks (DPD).
Interval to check the liveness of a peer actively using IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL
exchanges or IKEv1 R_U_THERE messages. Active DPD checking is only enforced
if no IKE or ESP/AH packet has been received for the configured DPD delay.
connections.<conn>.dpd_timeout = 0s
Timeout for DPD checks (IKEV1 only).
Charon by default uses the normal retransmission mechanism and timeouts to
check the liveness of a peer, as all messages are used for liveness
checking. For compatibility reasons, with IKEv1 a custom interval may be
specified; this option has no effect on connections using IKE2.
connections.<conn>.fragmentation = yes
Use IKE UDP datagram fragmentation (_yes_, _accept_, _no_ or _force_).
Use IKE fragmentation (proprietary IKEv1 extension or RFC 7383 IKEv2
fragmentation). Acceptable values are _yes_ (the default), _accept_,
_force_ and _no_. If set to _yes_, and the peer supports it, oversized IKE
messages will be sent in fragments. If set to _accept_, support for
fragmentation is announced to the peer but the daemon does not send its own
messages in fragments. If set to _force_ (only supported for IKEv1) the
initial IKE message will already be fragmented if required. Finally, setting
the option to _no_ will disable announcing support for this feature.
Note that fragmented IKE messages sent by a peer are always accepted
irrespective of the value of this option (even when set to _no_).
connections.<conn>.childless = allow
Use childless IKE_SA initiation (_allow_, _force_ or _never_).
Use childless IKE_SA initiation (RFC 6023) for IKEv2. Acceptable values
are _allow_ (the default), _force_ and _never_. If set to _allow_,
responders will accept childless IKE_SAs (as indicated via notify in the
IKE_SA_INIT response) while initiators continue to create regular IKE_SAs
with the first CHILD_SA created during IKE_AUTH, unless the IKE_SA is
initiated explicitly without any children (which will fail if the responder
does not support or has disabled this extension). If set to _force_, only
childless initiation is accepted and the first CHILD_SA is created with a
separate CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange (e.g. to use an independent DH exchange
for all CHILD_SAs). Finally, setting the option to _never_ disables support
for childless IKE_SAs as responder.
connections.<conn>.send_certreq = yes
Send certificate requests payloads (_yes_ or _no_).
Send certificate request payloads to offer trusted root CA certificates
to the peer. Certificate requests help the peer to choose an appropriate
certificate/private key for authentication and are enabled by default.
Disabling certificate requests can be useful if too many trusted root CA
certificates are installed, as each certificate request increases the size
of the initial IKE packets.
connections.<conn>.send_cert = ifasked
Send certificate payloads (_always_, _never_ or _ifasked_).
Send certificate payloads when using certificate authentication. With the
default of _ifasked_ the daemon sends certificate payloads only if
certificate requests have been received. _never_ disables sending of
certificate payloads altogether, _always_ causes certificate payloads to be
sent unconditionally whenever certificate authentication is used.
connections.<conn>.ppk_id =
String identifying the Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) to be used.
connections.<conn>.ppk_required = no
Whether a Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) is required for this connection.
connections.<conn>.keyingtries = 1
Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.
Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.
Instead of giving up initiation after the first retransmission sequence with
the default value of _1_, additional sequences may be started according to
the configured value. A value of _0_ initiates a new sequence until the
connection establishes or fails with a permanent error.
connections.<conn>.unique = no
Connection uniqueness policy (_never_, _no_, _keep_ or _replace_).
Connection uniqueness policy to enforce. To avoid multiple connections
from the same user, a uniqueness policy can be enforced. The value _never_
does never enforce such a policy, even if a peer included INITIAL_CONTACT
notification messages, whereas _no_ replaces existing connections for the
same identity if a new one has the INITIAL_CONTACT notify. _keep_ rejects
new connection attempts if the same user already has an active connection,
_replace_ deletes any existing connection if a new one for the same user
gets established.
To compare connections for uniqueness, the remote IKE identity is used. If
EAP or XAuth authentication is involved, the EAP-Identity or XAuth username
is used to enforce the uniqueness policy instead.
On initiators this setting specifies whether an INITIAL_CONTACT notify is
sent during IKE_AUTH if no existing connection is found with the remote
peer (determined by the identities of the first authentication round).
Unless set to _never_ the client will send a notify.
connections.<conn>.reauth_time = 0s
Time to schedule IKE reauthentication.
Time to schedule IKE reauthentication. IKE reauthentication recreates the
IKE/ISAKMP SA from scratch and re-evaluates the credentials. In asymmetric
configurations (with EAP or configuration payloads) it might not be possible
to actively reauthenticate as responder. The IKEv2 reauthentication lifetime
negotiation can instruct the client to perform reauthentication.
Reauthentication is disabled by default. Enabling it usually may lead
to small connection interruptions, as strongSwan uses a break-before-make
policy with IKEv2 to avoid any conflicts with associated tunnel resources.
connections.<conn>.rekey_time = 4h
Time to schedule IKE rekeying.
IKE rekeying refreshes key material using a Diffie-Hellman exchange, but
does not re-check associated credentials. It is supported in IKEv2 only,
IKEv1 performs a reauthentication procedure instead.
With the default value IKE rekeying is scheduled every 4 hours, minus the
configured **rand_time**. If a **reauth_time** is configured, **rekey_time**
defaults to zero disabling rekeying; explicitly set both to enforce
rekeying and reauthentication.
connections.<conn>.over_time = 10% of rekey_time/reauth_time
Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
To avoid having an IKE/ISAKMP kept alive if IKE reauthentication or rekeying
fails perpetually, a maximum hard lifetime may be specified. If the
IKE_SA fails to rekey or reauthenticate within the specified time, the
IKE_SA gets closed.
In contrast to CHILD_SA rekeying, **over_time** is relative in time to the
**rekey_time** _and_ **reauth_time** values, as it applies to both.
The default is 10% of the longer of **rekey_time** and **reauth_time**.
connections.<conn>.rand_time = over_time
Range of random time to subtract from rekey/reauth times.
Time range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
rekey/reauth times. To avoid having both peers initiating the rekey/reauth
procedure simultaneously, a random time gets subtracted from the
rekey/reauth times.
The default is equal to the configured **over_time**.
connections.<conn>.pools =
Comma separated list of named IP pools.
Comma separated list of named IP pools to allocate virtual IP addresses and
other configuration attributes from. Each name references a pool by name
from either the **pools** section or an external pool.
connections.<conn>.if_id_in = 0
Default inbound XFRM interface ID for children.
XFRM interface ID set on inbound policies/SA, can be overridden by child
config, see there for details.
connections.<conn>.if_id_out = 0
Default outbound XFRM interface ID for children.
XFRM interface ID set on outbound policies/SA, can be overridden by child
config, see there for details.
connections.<conn>.mediation = no
Whether this connection is a mediation connection.
Whether this connection is a mediation connection, that is, whether this
connection is used to mediate other connections using the IKEv2 Mediation
Extension. Mediation connections create no CHILD_SA.
connections.<conn>.mediated_by =
The name of the connection to mediate this connection through.
The name of the connection to mediate this connection through. If given, the
connection will be mediated through the named mediation connection.
The mediation connection must have **mediation** enabled.
connections.<conn>.mediation_peer =
Identity under which the peer is registered at the mediation server.
Identity under which the peer is registered at the mediation server, that
is, the IKE identity the other end of this connection uses as its local
identity on its connection to the mediation server. This is the identity we
request the mediation server to mediate us with. Only relevant on
connections that set **mediated_by**. If it is not given, the remote IKE
identity of the first authentication round of this connection will be used.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix> {}
Section for a local authentication round.
Section for a local authentication round. A local authentication round
defines the rules how authentication is performed for the local peer.
Multiple rounds may be defined to use IKEv2 RFC 4739 Multiple Authentication
or IKEv1 XAuth.
Each round is defined in a section having _local_ as prefix, and an optional
unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix may be
omitted.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.round = 0
Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are sorted. If
not specified rounds are ordered by their position in the config file/VICI
message.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.certs =
Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
directory or an absolute path.
The certificate used for authentication is selected based on the received
certificate request payloads. If no appropriate CA can be located, the
first certificate is used.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix> =
Section for a certificate candidate to use for authentication.
Section for a certificate candidate to use for authentication. Certificates
in _certs_ are transmitted as binary blobs, these sections offer more
flexibility.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.file =
Absolute path to the certificate to load.
Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
must be readable by it.
Configure either this or _handle_, but not both, in one section.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.handle =
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
Configure either this or _file_, but not both, in one section.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.slot =
Optional slot number of the token that stores the certificate.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.module =
Optional PKCS#11 module name.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.pubkeys =
Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for authentication.
Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for authentication.
The public keys may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _pubkey_
directory or an absolute path.
Even though multiple local public keys could be defined in principle, only
the first public key in the list is used for authentication.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.auth = pubkey
Authentication to perform locally (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
_eap[-method]_).
Authentication to perform locally. _pubkey_ uses public key authentication
using a private key associated to a usable certificate. _psk_ uses
pre-shared key authentication. The IKEv1 specific _xauth_ is used for
XAuth or Hybrid authentication, while the IKEv2 specific _eap_ keyword
defines EAP authentication.
For _xauth_, a specific backend name may be appended, separated by a dash.
The appropriate _xauth_ backend is selected to perform the XAuth exchange.
For traditional XAuth, the _xauth_ method is usually defined in the second
authentication round following an initial _pubkey_ (or _psk_) round. Using
_xauth_ in the first round performs Hybrid Mode client authentication.
For _eap_, a specific EAP method name may be appended, separated by a dash.
An EAP module implementing the appropriate method is selected to perform
the EAP conversation.
If both peers support RFC 7427 ("Signature Authentication in IKEv2")
specific hash algorithms to be used during IKEv2 authentication may be
configured. To do so use _ike:_ followed by a trust chain signature scheme
constraint (see description of the **remote** section's **auth** keyword).
For example, with _ike:pubkey-sha384-sha256_ a public key signature scheme
with either SHA-384 or SHA-256 would get used for authentication, in that
order and depending on the hash algorithms supported by the peer. If no
specific hash algorithms are configured, the default is to prefer an
algorithm that matches or exceeds the strength of the signature key.
If no constraints with _ike:_ prefix are configured any signature scheme
constraint (without _ike:_ prefix) will also apply to IKEv2 authentication,
unless this is disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5). To use RSASSA-PSS
signatures use _rsa/pss_ instead of _pubkey_ or _rsa_ as in e.g.
_ike:rsa/pss-sha256_. If _pubkey_ or _rsa_ constraints are configured
RSASSA-PSS signatures will only be used if enabled in
**strongswan.conf**(5).
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.id =
IKE identity to use for authentication round.
IKE identity to use for authentication round. When using certificate
authentication, the IKE identity must be contained in the certificate,
either as subject or as subjectAltName.
The identity can be an IP address, a fully-qualified domain name, an email
address or a Distinguished Name for which the ID type is determined
automatically and the string is converted to the appropriate encoding. To
enforce a specific identity type, a prefix may be used, followed by a colon
(:). If the number sign (#) follows the colon, the remaining data is
interpreted as hex encoding, otherwise the string is used as-is as the
identification data. Note that this implies that no conversion is performed
for non-string identities. For example, _ipv4:10.0.0.1_ does not create a
valid ID_IPV4_ADDR IKE identity, as it does not get converted to binary
0x0a000001. Instead, one could use _ipv4:#0a000001_ to get a valid identity,
but just using the implicit type with automatic conversion is usually
simpler. The same applies to the ASN1 encoded types. The following prefixes
are known: _ipv4_, _ipv6_, _rfc822_, _email_, _userfqdn_, _fqdn_, _dns_,
_asn1dn_, _asn1gn_ and _keyid_. Custom type prefixes may be specified by
surrounding the numerical type value by curly brackets.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.eap_id = id
Client EAP-Identity to use in EAP-Identity exchange and the EAP method.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.aaa_id = remote-id
Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method.
Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method. Some EAP methods, such
as EAP-TLS, use an identity for the server to perform mutual authentication.
This identity may differ from the IKE identity, especially when EAP
authentication is delegated from the IKE responder to an AAA backend.
For EAP-(T)TLS, this defines the identity for which the server must provide
a certificate in the TLS exchange.
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.xauth_id = id
Client XAuth username used in the XAuth exchange.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix> {}
Section for a remote authentication round.
Section for a remote authentication round. A remote authentication round
defines the constraints how the peers must authenticate to use this
connection. Multiple rounds may be defined to use IKEv2 RFC 4739 Multiple
Authentication or IKEv1 XAuth.
Each round is defined in a section having _remote_ as prefix, and an
optional unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix
may be omitted.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.round = 0
Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are sorted. If
not specified rounds are ordered by their position in the config file/VICI
message.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.id = %any
IKE identity to expect for authentication round.
IKE identity to expect for authentication round. Refer to the **local**
section's **id** keyword for details.
It's possible to use wildcards to match remote identities (e.g.
_*@strongswan.org_, _*.strongswan.org_, or _C=CH,O=strongSwan,CN=*_).
Connections with exact matches are preferred. When using distinguished names
with wildcards, the _charon.rdn_matching_ option in **strongswan.conf**(5)
specifies how RDNs are matched.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.eap_id = id
Identity to use as peer identity during EAP authentication.
Identity to use as peer identity during EAP authentication. If set to _%any_
the EAP-Identity method will be used to ask the client for an identity.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.groups =
Authorization group memberships to require.
Comma separated authorization group memberships to require. The peer must
prove membership to at least one of the specified groups. Group membership
can be certified by different means, for example by appropriate Attribute
Certificates or by an AAA backend involved in the authentication.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert_policy =
Certificate policy OIDs the peer's certificate must have.
Comma separated list of certificate policy OIDs the peer's certificate must
have. OIDs are specified using the numerical dotted representation.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.certs =
Comma separated list of certificate to accept for authentication.
Comma separated list of certificates to accept for authentication.
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
directory or an absolute path.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix> =
Section for a certificate to accept for authentication.
Section for a certificate to accept for authentication. Certificates
in _certs_ are transmitted as binary blobs, these sections offer more
flexibility.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.file =
Absolute path to the certificate to load.
Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
must be readable by it.
Configure either this or _handle_, but not both, in one section.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.handle =
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
Configure either this or _file_, but not both, in one section.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.slot =
Optional slot number of the token that stores the certificate.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.module =
Optional PKCS#11 module name.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacerts =
Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_
directory or an absolute path.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix> =
Section for a CA certificate to accept for authentication.
Section for a CA certificate to accept for authentication. Certificates
in _cacerts_ are transmitted as binary blobs, these sections offer more
flexibility.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.file =
Absolute path to the certificate to load.
Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
must be readable by it.
Configure either this or _handle_, but not both, in one section.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.handle =
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
Configure either this or _file_, but not both, in one section.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.slot =
Optional slot number of the token that stores the CA certificate.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.module =
Optional PKCS#11 module name.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.ca_id =
Identity in CA certificate to accept for authentication.
The specified identity must be contained in one (intermediate) CA
of the remote peer trustchain, either as subject or as subjectAltName.
This has the same effect as specifying _cacerts_ to force clients under
a CA to specific connections; it does not require the CA certificate to
be available locally, and can be received from the peer during the
IKE exchange.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.pubkeys =
Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for authentication.
Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for authentication.
The public keys may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _pubkey_
directory or an absolute path.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.revocation = relaxed
Certificate revocation policy, (_strict_, _ifuri_ or _relaxed_).
Certificate revocation policy for CRL or OCSP revocation.
A _strict_ revocation policy fails if no revocation information is
available, i.e. the certificate is not known to be unrevoked.
_ifuri_ fails only if a CRL/OCSP URI is available, but certificate
revocation checking fails, i.e. there should be revocation information
available, but it could not be obtained.
The default revocation policy _relaxed_ fails only if a certificate
is revoked, i.e. it is explicitly known that it is bad.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.auth = pubkey
Authentication to expect from remote (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
_eap[-method]_).
Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** section's **auth**
keyword description about the details of supported mechanisms.
To require a trustchain public key strength for the remote side, specify the
key type followed by the minimum strength in bits (for example _ecdsa-384_
or _rsa-2048-ecdsa-256_). To limit the acceptable set of hashing algorithms
for trustchain validation, append hash algorithms to _pubkey_ or a key
strength definition (for example _pubkey-sha256-sha512_,
_rsa-2048-sha256-sha384-sha512_ or
_rsa-2048-sha256-ecdsa-256-sha256-sha384_).
Unless disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5), or explicit IKEv2 signature
constraints are configured (refer to the description of the **local**
section's **auth** keyword for details), such key types and hash algorithms
are also applied as constraints against IKEv2 signature authentication
schemes used by the remote side. To require RSASSA-PSS signatures use
_rsa/pss_ instead of _pubkey_ or _rsa_ as in e.g. _rsa/pss-sha256_. If
_pubkey_ or _rsa_ constraints are configured RSASSA-PSS signatures will only
be accepted if enabled in **strongswan.conf**(5).
To specify trust chain constraints for EAP-(T)TLS, append a colon to the
EAP method, followed by the key type/size and hash algorithm as discussed
above (e.g. _eap-tls:ecdsa-384-sha384_).
connections.<conn>.children.<child> {}
CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.
CHILD_SA configuration sub-section. Each connection definition may have
one or more sections in its _children_ subsection. The section name
defines the name of the CHILD_SA configuration, which must be unique within
the connection.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.ah_proposals =
AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA. A proposal is a set of algorithms.
For AH, this includes an integrity algorithm and an optional Diffie-Hellman
group. If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
negotiation uses a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
group (refer to _esp_proposals_ for details).
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.
Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
for interoperability. By default no AH proposals are included, instead ESP
is proposed.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.esp_proposals = default
ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA. A proposal is a set of algorithms.
For ESP non-AEAD proposals, this includes an integrity algorithm, an
encryption algorithm, an optional Diffie-Hellman group and an optional
Extended Sequence Number Mode indicator. For AEAD proposals, a combined
mode algorithm is used instead of the separate encryption/integrity
algorithms.
If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
negotiation use a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
group. However, for IKEv2, the keys of the CHILD_SA created implicitly with
the IKE_SA will always be derived from the IKE_SA's key material. So any DH
group specified here will only apply when the CHILD_SA is later rekeyed or
is created with a separate CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange. A proposal mismatch
might, therefore, not immediately be noticed when the SA is established, but
may later cause rekeying to fail.
Extended Sequence Number support may be indicated with the _esn_ and _noesn_
values, both may be included to indicate support for both modes. If omitted,
_noesn_ is assumed.
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.
Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
for interoperability. If no algorithms are specified for AH nor ESP,
the _default_ set of algorithms for ESP is included.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.sha256_96 = no
Use incorrect 96-bit truncation for HMAC-SHA-256.
HMAC-SHA-256 is used with 128-bit truncation with IPsec. For compatibility
with implementations that incorrectly use 96-bit truncation this option may
be enabled to configure the shorter truncation length in the kernel. This
is not negotiated, so this only works with peers that use the incorrect
truncation length (or have this option enabled).
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.local_ts = dynamic
Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
Comma separated list of local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
Each selector is a CIDR subnet definition, followed by an optional
proto/port selector. The special value _dynamic_ may be used instead of a
subnet definition, which gets replaced by the tunnel outer address or the
virtual IP, if negotiated. This is the default.
A protocol/port selector is surrounded by opening and closing square
brackets. Between these brackets, a numeric or **getservent**(3) protocol
name may be specified. After the optional protocol restriction, an optional
port restriction may be specified, separated by a slash. The port
restriction may be numeric, a **getservent**(3) service name, or the special
value _opaque_ for RFC 4301 OPAQUE selectors. Port ranges may be specified
as well, none of the kernel backends currently support port ranges, though.
When IKEv1 is used only the first selector is interpreted, except if
the Cisco Unity extension plugin is used. This is due to a limitation of the
IKEv1 protocol, which only allows a single pair of selectors per CHILD_SA.
So to tunnel traffic matched by several pairs of selectors when using IKEv1
several children (CHILD_SAs) have to be defined that cover the selectors.
The IKE daemon uses traffic selector narrowing for IKEv1, the same way it is
standardized and implemented for IKEv2. However, this may lead to problems
with other implementations. To avoid that, configure identical selectors in
such scenarios.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.remote_ts = dynamic
Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
Comma separated list of remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA. See
**local_ts** for a description of the selector syntax.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_time = 1h
Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.
Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA rekeying refreshes key
material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange if a group is
specified in the proposal.
To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
in the range of **rand_time** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
lifetime.
By default CHILD_SA rekeying is scheduled every hour, minus **rand_time**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_time = rekey_time + 10%
Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.
Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually this hard lifetime
is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed before.
If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.
The default is 10% more than the **rekey_time**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
Range of random time to subtract from **rekey_time**.
Time range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
**rekey_time**. The default is the difference between **life_time** and
**rekey_time**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_bytes = 0
Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying.
Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA
rekeying refreshes key material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange
if a group is specified in the proposal.
To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
in the range of **rand_bytes** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
volume limit.
Volume based CHILD_SA rekeying is disabled by default.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually this hard
volume limit is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed before.
If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.
The default is 10% more than **rekey_bytes**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
Range of random bytes to subtract from **rekey_bytes**.
Byte range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
**rekey_bytes**. The default is the difference between **life_bytes** and
**rekey_bytes**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_packets = 0
Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying.
Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA
rekeying refreshes key material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange
if a group is specified in the proposal.
To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
in the range of **rand_packets** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
packet count limit.
Packet count based CHILD_SA rekeying is disabled by default.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually
this hard packets limit is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed
before. If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.
The default is 10% more than **rekey_bytes**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
Range of random packets to subtract from **packets_bytes**.
Packet range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
**rekey_packets**. The default is the difference between **life_packets**
and **rekey_packets**.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.updown =
Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hostaccess = no
Hostaccess variable to pass to **updown** script.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mode = tunnel
IPsec Mode to establish (_tunnel_, _transport_, _transport_proxy_, _beet_,
_pass_ or _drop_).
IPsec Mode to establish CHILD_SA with. _tunnel_ negotiates the CHILD_SA
in IPsec Tunnel Mode, whereas _transport_ uses IPsec Transport Mode.
_transport_proxy_ signifying the special Mobile IPv6 Transport Proxy Mode.
_beet_ is the Bound End to End Tunnel mixture mode, working with fixed inner
addresses without the need to include them in each packet.
Both _transport_ and _beet_ modes are subject to mode negotiation; _tunnel_
mode is negotiated if the preferred mode is not available.
_pass_ and _drop_ are used to install shunt policies which explicitly
bypass the defined traffic from IPsec processing or drop it, respectively.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.policies = yes
Whether to install IPsec policies or not.
Whether to install IPsec policies or not. Disabling this can be useful in
some scenarios e.g. MIPv6, where policies are not managed by the IKE daemon.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.policies_fwd_out = no
Whether to install outbound FWD IPsec policies or not.
Whether to install outbound FWD IPsec policies or not. Enabling this is
required in case there is a drop policy that would match and block forwarded
traffic for this CHILD_SA.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.dpd_action = clear
Action to perform on DPD timeout (_clear_, _trap_ or _restart_).
Action to perform for this CHILD_SA on DPD timeout. The default _clear_
closes the CHILD_SA and does not take further action. _trap_ installs
a trap policy, which will catch matching traffic and tries to re-negotiate
the tunnel on-demand. _restart_ immediately tries to re-negotiate the
CHILD_SA under a fresh IKE_SA.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.ipcomp = no
Enable IPComp compression before encryption.
Enable IPComp compression before encryption. If enabled, IKE tries to
negotiate IPComp compression to compress ESP payload data prior to
encryption.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.inactivity = 0s
Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.
Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity. If no traffic has
been processed in either direction for the configured timeout, the CHILD_SA
gets closed due to inactivity. The default value of _0_ disables inactivity
checks.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.reqid = 0
Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.
Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA. This might be helpful in some
scenarios, but works only if each CHILD_SA configuration is instantiated
not more than once. The default of _0_ uses dynamic reqids, allocated
incrementally.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.priority = 0
Optional fixed priority for IPsec policies.
Optional fixed priority for IPsec policies. This could be useful to install
high-priority drop policies. The default of _0_ uses dynamically calculated
priorities based on the size of the traffic selectors.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.interface =
Optional interface name to restrict IPsec policies.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_in = 0/0x00000000
Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic. On Linux, Netfilter may require
marks on each packet to match an SA/policy having that option set. This
allows installing duplicate policies and enables Netfilter rules to select
specific SAs/policies for incoming traffic. Note that inbound marks are
only set on policies, by default, unless *mark_in_sa* is enabled. The
special value _%unique_ sets a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance, beyond
that the value _%unique-dir_ assigns a different unique mark for each
CHILD_SA direction (in/out).
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_in_sa = no
Whether to set *mark_in* on the inbound SA.
Whether to set *mark_in* on the inbound SA. By default, the inbound mark is
only set on the inbound policy. The tuple destination address, protocol and
SPI is unique and the mark is not required to find the correct SA, allowing
to mark traffic after decryption instead (where more specific selectors may
be used) to match different policies. Marking packets before decryption is
still possible, even if no mark is set on the SA.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_out = 0/0x00000000
Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic. On Linux, Netfilter may require
marks on each packet to match a policy/SA having that option set. This
allows installing duplicate policies and enables Netfilter rules to select
specific policies/SAs for outgoing traffic. The special value _%unique_ sets
a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance, beyond that the value _%unique-dir_
assigns a different unique mark for each CHILD_SA direction (in/out).
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.set_mark_in = 0/0x00000000
Netfilter mark applied to packets after the inbound IPsec SA processed them.
Netfilter mark applied to packets after the inbound IPsec SA processed them.
This way it's not necessary to mark packets via Netfilter before decryption
or right afterwards to match policies or process them differently (e.g. via
policy routing).
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff. The special value _%same_ uses
the value (but not the mask) from **mark_in** as mark value, which can be
fixed, _%unique_ or _%unique-dir_.
Setting marks in XFRM input requires Linux 4.19 or higher.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.set_mark_out = 0/0x00000000
Netfilter mark applied to packets after the outbound IPsec SA processed
them.
Netfilter mark applied to packets after the outbound IPsec SA processed
them. This allows processing ESP packets differently than the original
traffic (e.g. via policy routing).
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff. The special value _%same_ uses
the value (but not the mask) from **mark_out** as mark value, which can be
fixed, _%unique_ or _%unique-dir_.
Setting marks in XFRM output is supported since Linux 4.14. Setting a mask
requires at least Linux 4.19.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.if_id_in = 0
Inbound XFRM interface ID.
XFRM interface ID set on inbound policies/SA. This allows installing
duplicate policies/SAs and associates them with an interface with the same
ID. The special value _%unique_ sets a unique interface ID on each CHILD_SA
instance, beyond that the value _%unique-dir_ assigns a different unique
interface ID for each CHILD_SA direction (in/out).
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.if_id_out = 0
Outbound XFRM interface ID.
XFRM interface ID set on outbound policies/SA. This allows installing
duplicate policies/SAs and associates them with an interface with the same
ID. The special value _%unique_ sets a unique interface ID on each CHILD_SA
instance, beyond that the value _%unique-dir_ assigns a different unique
interface ID for each CHILD_SA direction (in/out).
The daemon will not install routes for CHILD_SAs that have this option set.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.tfc_padding = 0
Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
Pads ESP packets with additional data to have a consistent ESP packet size
for improved Traffic Flow Confidentiality. The padding defines the minimum
size of all ESP packets sent.
The default value of 0 disables TFC padding, the special value _mtu_ adds
TFC padding to create a packet size equal to the Path Maximum Transfer Unit.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.replay_window = 32
IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA.
IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA. Larger values than the
default of 32 are supported using the Netlink backend only, a value of 0
disables IPsec replay protection.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hw_offload = no
Enable hardware offload for this CHILD_SA, if supported by the IPsec
implementation.
Enable hardware offload for this CHILD_SA, if supported by the IPsec
implementation. The value _yes_ enforces offloading and the installation
will fail if it's not supported by either kernel or device. The value _auto_
enables offloading, if it's supported, but the installation does not fail
otherwise.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.copy_df = yes
Whether to copy the DF bit to the outer IPv4 header in tunnel mode.
Whether to copy the DF bit to the outer IPv4 header in tunnel mode. This
effectively disables Path MTU discovery (PMTUD). Controlling this behavior
is not supported by all kernel interfaces.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.copy_ecn = yes
Whether to copy the ECN header field to/from the outer IP header in tunnel
mode.
Whether to copy the ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) header field
to/from the outer IP header in tunnel mode. Controlling this behavior is not
supported by all kernel interfaces.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.copy_dscp = out
Whether to copy the DSCP header field to/from the outer IP header in tunnel
mode.
Whether to copy the DSCP (Differentiated Services Field Codepoint) header
field to/from the outer IP header in tunnel mode. The value _out_ only
copies the field from the inner to the outer header, the value _in_ does the
opposite and only copies the field from the outer to the inner header when
decapsulating, the value _yes_ copies the field in both directions, and the
value _no_ disables copying the field altogether. Setting this to _yes_ or
_in_ could allow an attacker to adversely affect other traffic at the
receiver, which is why the default is _out_. Controlling this behavior is
not supported by all kernel interfaces.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.start_action = none
Action to perform after loading the configuration (_none_, _trap_, _start_).
Action to perform after loading the configuration. The default of _none_
loads the connection only, which then can be manually initiated or used as
a responder configuration.
The value _trap_ installs a trap policy, which triggers the tunnel as soon
as matching traffic has been detected. The value _start_ initiates
the connection actively.
When unloading or replacing a CHILD_SA configuration having a
**start_action** different from _none_, the inverse action is performed.
Configurations with _start_ get closed, while such with _trap_ get
uninstalled.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.close_action = none
Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (_none_, _trap_, _start_).
Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed by the peer. The default of
_none_ does not take any action, _trap_ installs a trap policy for the
CHILD_SA. _start_ tries to re-create the CHILD_SA.
**close_action** does not provide any guarantee that the CHILD_SA is kept
alive. It acts on explicit close messages only, but not on negotiation
failures. Use trap policies to reliably re-create failed CHILD_SAs.
secrets { # }
Section defining secrets for IKE/EAP/XAuth authentication and private
key decryption.
Section defining secrets for IKE/EAP/XAuth authentication and private key
decryption. The **secrets** section takes sub-sections having a specific
prefix which defines the secret type.
It is not recommended to define any private key decryption passphrases,
as then there is no real security benefit in having encrypted keys. Either
store the key unencrypted or enter the keys manually when loading
credentials.
secrets.eap<suffix> { # }
EAP secret section for a specific secret.
EAP secret section for a specific secret. Each EAP secret is defined in
a unique section having the _eap_ prefix. EAP secrets are used for XAuth
authentication as well.
secrets.xauth<suffix> { # }
XAuth secret section for a specific secret.
XAuth secret section for a specific secret. **xauth** is just an alias
for **eap**, secrets under both section prefixes are used for both EAP and
XAuth authentication.
secrets.eap<suffix>.secret =
Value of the EAP/XAuth secret.
Value of the EAP/XAuth secret. It may either be an ASCII string, a hex
encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if it
has a _0s_ prefix in its value.
secrets.eap<suffix>.id<suffix> =
Identity the EAP/XAuth secret belongs to.
Identity the EAP/XAuth secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities may
be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
multiple users.
secrets.ntlm<suffix> { # }
NTLM secret section for a specific secret.
NTLM secret section for a specific secret. Each NTLM secret is defined in
a unique section having the _ntlm_ prefix. NTLM secrets may only be used for
EAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication.
secrets.ntlm<suffix>.secret =
Value of the NTLM secret.
Value of the NTLM secret, which is the NT Hash of the actual secret, that
is, MD4(UTF-16LE(secret)). The resulting 16-byte value may either be given
as a hex encoded string with a _0x_ prefix or as a Base64 encoded string
with a _0s_ prefix.
secrets.ntlm<suffix>.id<suffix> =
Identity the NTLM secret belongs to.
Identity the NTLM secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities may
be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
multiple users.
secrets.ike<suffix> { # }
IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret.
IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret. Each IKE PSK is defined
in a unique section having the _ike_ prefix.
secrets.ike<suffix>.secret =
Value of the IKE preshared secret.
Value of the IKE preshared secret. It may either be an ASCII string,
a hex encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if
it has a _0s_ prefix in its value.
secrets.ike<suffix>.id<suffix> =
IKE identity the IKE preshared secret belongs to.
IKE identity the IKE preshared secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities
may be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
multiple peers.
secrets.ppk<suffix> { # }
Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) section for a specific secret.
Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) section for a specific secret. Each PPK is
defined in a unique section having the _ppk_ prefix.
secrets.ppk<suffix>.secret =
Value of the PPK.
Value of the PPK. It may either be an ASCII string, a hex encoded string if
it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if it has a _0s_ prefix in
its value. Should have at least 256 bits of entropy for 128-bit security.
secrets.ppk<suffix>.id<suffix> =
PPK identity the PPK belongs to.
PPK identity the PPK belongs to. Multiple unique identities
may be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
multiple peers.
secrets.private<suffix> { # }
Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _private_ folder.
secrets.private<suffix>.file =
File name in the _private_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.
secrets.private<suffix>.secret
Value of decryption passphrase for private key.
secrets.rsa<suffix> { # }
Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _rsa_ folder.
secrets.rsa<suffix>.file =
File name in the _rsa_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.
secrets.rsa<suffix>.secret
Value of decryption passphrase for RSA key.
secrets.ecdsa<suffix> { # }
Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _ecdsa_ folder.
secrets.ecdsa<suffix>.file =
File name in the _ecdsa_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.
secrets.ecdsa<suffix>.secret
Value of decryption passphrase for ECDSA key.
secrets.pkcs8<suffix> { # }
Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _pkcs8_ folder.
secrets.pkcs8<suffix>.file =
File name in the _pkcs8_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.
secrets.pkcs8<suffix>.secret
Value of decryption passphrase for PKCS#8 key.
secrets.pkcs12<suffix> { # }
PKCS#12 decryption passphrase for a container in the _pkcs12_ folder.
secrets.pkcs12<suffix>.file =
File name in the _pkcs12_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.
secrets.pkcs12<suffix>.secret
Value of decryption passphrase for PKCS#12 container.
secrets.token<suffix> { # }
Definition for a private key that's stored on a token/smartcard.
secrets.token<suffix>.handle =
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the private key on the token.
secrets.token<suffix>.slot =
Optional slot number to access the token.
secrets.token<suffix>.module =
Optional PKCS#11 module name to access the token.
secrets.token<suffix>.pin =
Optional PIN required to access the key on the token. If none is provided
the user is prompted during an interactive --load-creds call.
pools { # }
Section defining named pools.
Section defining named pools. Named pools may be referenced by connections
with the **pools** option to assign virtual IPs and other configuration
attributes.
pools.<name> { # }
Section defining a single pool with a unique name.
pools.<name>.addrs =
Addresses allocated in pool.
Subnet or range defining addresses allocated in pool. Accepts a single CIDR
subnet defining the pool to allocate addresses from or an address range
(<from>-<to>). Pools must be unique and non-overlapping.
pools.<name>.<attr> =
Comma separated list of additional attributes from type <attr>.
Comma separated list of additional attributes of type **<attr>**. The
attribute type may be one of _dns_, _nbns_, _dhcp_, _netmask_, _server_,
_subnet_, _split_include_ and _split_exclude_ to define addresses or CIDR
subnets for the corresponding attribute types. Alternatively, **<attr>** can
be a numerical identifier, for which string attribute values are accepted
as well.
authorities { # }
Section defining attributes of certification authorities.
authorities.<name> { # }
Section defining a certification authority with a unique name.
authorities.<name>.cacert =
CA certificate belonging to the certification authority.
CA certificate belonging to the certification authority. The certificates
may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_ directory or an
absolute path.
Configure one of _cacert_, _file_, or _handle_ per section.
authorities.<name>.file =
Absolute path to the certificate to load.
Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
must be readable by it.
Configure one of _cacert_, _file_, or _handle_ per section.
authorities.<name>.handle =
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
Configure one of _cacert_, _file_, or _handle_ per section.
authorities.<name>.slot =
Optional slot number of the token that stores the CA certificate.
authorities.<name>.module =
Optional PKCS#11 module name.
authorities.<name>.crl_uris =
Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points.
Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points (ldap, http, or file URI).
authorities.<name>.ocsp_uris =
Comma-separated list of OCSP URIs.
authorities.<name>.cert_uri_base =
Defines the base URI for the Hash and URL feature supported by IKEv2.
Defines the base URI for the Hash and URL feature supported by IKEv2.
Instead of exchanging complete certificates, IKEv2 allows one to send an
URI that resolves to the DER encoded certificate. The certificate URIs are
built by appending the SHA1 hash of the DER encoded certificates to this
base URI.
include conf.d/*.conf
Include config snippets
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