Annotation of embedaddon/strongswan/testing/tests/tnc/tnccs-20-hcd-eap/description.txt, revision 1.1.1.1

1.1       misho       1: The hardcopy devices <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> set up a connection each to the policy enforcement
                      2: point <b>moon</b>. At the outset the gateway authenticates itself to the devices by sending an IKEv2
                      3: <b>RSA signature</b> accompanied by a certificate. <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> then set up an
                      4: <b>EAP-TTLS</b> tunnel each via gateway <b>moon</b> to the policy decision point <b>alice</b>
                      5: authenticated by an X.509 AAA certificate.  In a next step the EAP-TNC protocol is used within
                      6: the EAP-TTLS tunnel to determine the health of <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> via the <b>IF-TNCCS 2.0</b>
                      7: client-server interface defined by <b>RFC 5793 PB-TNC</b>. The communication between IMCs and IMVs
                      8: is based on the <b>IF-M</b> protocol defined by <b>RFC 5792 PA-TNC</b>.
                      9: <p>
                     10: The HCD IMC on the hardcopy devices <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> sends printer attributes to the HCD IMV
                     11: located on the RADIUS server <b>alice</b>. Because some mandatory HCD attributes are missing, the hardcopy devices <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> are blocked from accessing the network behind gateway <b>moon</b>.

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