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Strongswan

The roadwarriors <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> set up a connection each to the policy enforcement
point <b>moon</b>. At the outset the gateway authenticates itself to the clients by sending an IKEv2
<b>RSA signature</b> accompanied by a certificate. <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> then set up an
<b>EAP-TTLS</b> tunnel each via gateway <b>moon</b> to the policy decision point <b>alice</b>
authenticated by an X.509 AAA certificate. The strong EAP-TTLS tunnel protects the ensuing weak
client authentication based on <b>EAP-MD5</b>. In a next step the EAP-TNC protocol is used within
the EAP-TTLS tunnel to determine the health of <b>carol</b> and <b>dave</b> via the <b>IF-TNCCS 2.0</b>
client-server interface defined by <b>RFC 5793 PB-TNC</b>. The communication between IMCs and IMVs
is based on the <b>IF-M</b> protocol defined by <b>RFC 5792 PA-TNC</b>. The <b>SWIMA</b> IMC on <b>carol</b>
is requested to deliver a concise <b>Software ID Inventory</b> whereas <b>dave</b> must send a full
<b>Software Inventory</b>.
<p>
<b>carol</b> passes the health test and <b>dave</b> fails. Based on these measurements the clients
are connected by gateway <b>moon</b> to the "rw-allow" and "rw-isolate" subnets, respectively.