/* * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2013 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. */ #define _SUDO_MAIN #ifdef __TANDEM # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef STDC_HEADERS # include # include #else # ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H # include # endif #endif /* STDC_HEADERS */ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS) # include # endif # include #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */ #ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H # include #endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H # include #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H # include # ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS # define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon" # endif # ifndef LOGIN_SETENV # define LOGIN_SETENV 0 # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX # include #endif #include #ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO # include "compat/getaddrinfo.h" #endif #include "sudoers.h" #include "auth/sudo_auth.h" #include "secure_path.h" /* * Prototypes */ static char *find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out); static int cb_runas_default(const char *); static int cb_sudoers_locale(const char *); static int set_cmnd(void); static void create_admin_success_flag(void); static void init_vars(char * const *); static void set_fqdn(void); static void set_loginclass(struct passwd *); static void set_runasgr(const char *); static void set_runaspw(const char *); static bool tty_present(void); /* * Globals */ struct sudo_user sudo_user; struct passwd *list_pw; int long_list; uid_t timestamp_uid; #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H char *login_style; #endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */ int sudo_mode; static char *prev_user; static char *runas_user; static char *runas_group; static struct sudo_nss_list *snl; /* XXX - must be extern for audit bits of sudo_auth.c */ int NewArgc; char **NewArgv; int sudoers_policy_init(void *info, char * const envp[]) { volatile int sources = 0; struct sudo_nss *nss, *nss_next; debug_decl(sudoers_policy_init, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) bindtextdomain("sudoers", LOCALEDIR); sudo_setpwent(); sudo_setgrent(); /* Register fatal/fatalx callback. */ fatal_callback_register(sudoers_cleanup); /* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */ env_init(envp); /* Setup defaults data structures. */ init_defaults(); /* Parse info from front-end. */ sudo_mode = sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(info, &runas_user, &runas_group); init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */ /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */ snl = sudo_read_nss(); /* LDAP or NSS may modify the euid so we need to be root for the open. */ set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(nss, snl, entries, nss_next) { if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) { sources++; if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0) log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries")); } else { TAILQ_REMOVE(snl, nss, entries); } } if (sources == 0) { warningx(U_("no valid sudoers sources found, quitting")); debug_return_bool(-1); } /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */ /* * Initialize external group plugin, if any. */ if (def_group_plugin) { if (group_plugin_load(def_group_plugin) != true) def_group_plugin = NULL; } /* * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers. * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it. */ /* XXX - qpm4u does more here as it may have already set runas_pw */ if (runas_group != NULL) { set_runasgr(runas_group); if (runas_user != NULL) set_runaspw(runas_user); } else set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default); if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS)) log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries")); if (def_fqdn) set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */ /* Set login class if applicable. */ set_loginclass(runas_pw ? runas_pw : sudo_user.pw); restore_perms(); debug_return_bool(true); } int sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[], void *closure) { char **edit_argv = NULL; char *iolog_path = NULL; mode_t cmnd_umask = 0777; struct sudo_nss *nss; int cmnd_status = -1, oldlocale, validated; volatile int rval = true; debug_decl(sudoers_policy_main, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) /* XXX - would like to move this to policy.c but need the cleanup. */ if (fatal_setjmp() != 0) { /* error recovery via fatal(), fatalx() or log_fatal() */ rval = -1; goto done; } /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { warningx(U_("sudoers specifies that root is not allowed to sudo")); goto bad; } set_perms(PERM_INITIAL); /* Environment variables specified on the command line. */ if (env_add != NULL && env_add[0] != NULL) sudo_user.env_vars = env_add; /* * Make a local copy of argc/argv, with special handling * for pseudo-commands and the '-i' option. */ if (argc == 0) { NewArgc = 1; NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 1, sizeof(char *)); NewArgv[0] = user_cmnd; NewArgv[1] = NULL; } else { /* Must leave an extra slot before NewArgv for bash's --login */ NewArgc = argc; NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 2, sizeof(char *)); memcpy(++NewArgv, argv, argc * sizeof(char *)); NewArgv[NewArgc] = NULL; if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && runas_pw != NULL) NewArgv[0] = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_shell); } /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)) def_preserve_groups = true; /* Find command in path and apply per-command Defaults. */ cmnd_status = set_cmnd(); /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */ if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) { if (!def_closefrom_override) { warningx(U_("you are not permitted to use the -C option")); goto bad; } def_closefrom = user_closefrom; } /* * Check sudoers sources, using the locale specified in sudoers. */ sudoers_setlocale(SUDOERS_LOCALE_SUDOERS, &oldlocale); validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST; TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) { validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag); if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { /* Handle [SUCCESS=return] */ if (nss->ret_if_found) break; } else { /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */ if (nss->ret_if_notfound) break; } } /* Restore user's locale. */ sudoers_setlocale(oldlocale, NULL); if (safe_cmnd == NULL) safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd); /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */ if (runas_pw == NULL) set_runaspw(user_name); /* * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified. */ if (def_timestampowner) { struct passwd *pw = NULL; if (*def_timestampowner == '#') { const char *errstr; uid_t uid = atoid(def_timestampowner + 1, NULL, NULL, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) pw = sudo_getpwuid(uid); } if (pw == NULL) pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner); if (pw != NULL) { timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid; sudo_pw_delref(pw); } else { log_warning(0, N_("timestamp owner (%s): No such user"), def_timestampowner); timestamp_uid = ROOT_UID; } } /* If no command line args and "shell_noargs" is not set, error out. */ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) { rval = -2; /* usage error */ goto done; } /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */ if (def_requiretty && !tty_present()) { audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("no tty")); warningx(U_("sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo")); goto bad; } /* * We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user * specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs. */ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) || (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv)) def_env_reset = false; /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ rebuild_env(); /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */ rval = check_user(validated, sudo_mode); if (rval != true) { if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) log_denial(validated, false); goto done; } /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { struct passwd *pw; if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) { if (sudo_user.pw != NULL) sudo_pw_delref(sudo_user.pw); sudo_user.pw = pw; } } } /* If the user was not allowed to run the command we are done. */ if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { log_failure(validated, cmnd_status); goto bad; } /* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */ create_admin_success_flag(); /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) { audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("command in current directory")); warningx(U_("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); goto bad; } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) { if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) { audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]); warningx(U_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]); } else { audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd); warningx(U_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd); } goto bad; } /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) { if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) { warningx(U_("sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment")); goto bad; } else validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); } if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))) { if ((def_log_input || def_log_output) && def_iolog_file && def_iolog_dir) { const char prefix[] = "iolog_path="; iolog_path = expand_iolog_path(prefix, def_iolog_dir, def_iolog_file, &sudo_user.iolog_file); sudo_user.iolog_file++; } } log_allowed(validated); if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) rval = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST)) display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); /* XXX - return val */ /* Cleanup sudoers sources */ TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) { nss->close(nss); } if (def_group_plugin) group_plugin_unload(); if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) { /* rval already set appropriately */ goto done; } /* * Set umask based on sudoers. * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too * unless umask_override is set. */ if (def_umask != 0777) { cmnd_umask = def_umask; if (!def_umask_override) cmnd_umask |= user_umask; } if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { char *p; /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */ if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL) p = NewArgv[0]; *p = '-'; NewArgv[0] = p; /* * Newer versions of bash require the --login option to be used * in conjunction with the -c option even if the shell name starts * with a '-'. Unfortunately, bash 1.x uses -login, not --login * so this will cause an error for that. */ if (NewArgc > 1 && strcmp(NewArgv[0], "-bash") == 0 && strcmp(NewArgv[1], "-c") == 0) { /* Use the extra slot before NewArgv so we can store --login. */ NewArgv--; NewArgc++; NewArgv[0] = NewArgv[1]; NewArgv[1] = "--login"; } #if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM)) /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true); #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H /* Set environment based on login class. */ if (login_class) { login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class); if (lc != NULL) { setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV); login_close(lc); } } #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ } /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ if (def_env_file) read_env_file(def_env_file, false); /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */ insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { efree(safe_cmnd); safe_cmnd = find_editor(NewArgc - 1, NewArgv + 1, &edit_argv); if (safe_cmnd == NULL) goto bad; } /* Must audit before uid change. */ audit_success(NewArgv); /* Setup execution environment to pass back to front-end. */ rval = sudoers_policy_exec_setup(edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv, env_get(), cmnd_umask, iolog_path, closure); /* Zero out stashed copy of environment, it is owned by the front-end. */ env_init(NULL); goto done; bad: rval = false; done: fatal_disable_setjmp(); rewind_perms(); /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */ sudo_endpwent(); sudo_endgrent(); debug_return_bool(rval); } /* * Initialize timezone and fill in ``sudo_user'' struct. */ static void init_vars(char * const envp[]) { char * const * ep; bool unknown_user = false; debug_decl(init_vars, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) sudoers_initlocale(setlocale(LC_ALL, NULL), def_sudoers_locale); for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) { /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */ switch (**ep) { case 'K': if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0) user_ccname = *ep + 11; break; case 'P': if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0) user_path = *ep + 5; break; case 'S': if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0) user_prompt = *ep + 12; else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0) prev_user = *ep + 10; break; } } /* * Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd if we don't already * have one. */ if (sudo_user.pw == NULL) { if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwnam(user_name)) == NULL) { /* * It is not unusual for users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout * file which can cause sudo to be run during reboot after the * YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died. */ if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) fatalx(U_("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid); /* Need to make a fake struct passwd for the call to log_fatal(). */ sudo_user.pw = sudo_mkpwent(user_name, user_uid, user_gid, NULL, NULL); unknown_user = true; } } /* * Get group list and store initialize permissions. */ if (user_group_list == NULL) user_group_list = sudo_get_grlist(sudo_user.pw); set_perms(PERM_INITIAL); /* Set runas callback. */ sudo_defs_table[I_RUNAS_DEFAULT].callback = cb_runas_default; /* Set locale callback. */ sudo_defs_table[I_SUDOERS_LOCALE].callback = cb_sudoers_locale; /* Set maxseq callback. */ sudo_defs_table[I_MAXSEQ].callback = io_set_max_sessid; /* It is now safe to use log_fatal() and set_perms() */ if (unknown_user) log_fatal(0, N_("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid); debug_return; } /* * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables * and apply any command-specific defaults entries. */ static int set_cmnd(void) { int rval; char *path = user_path; debug_decl(set_cmnd, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) /* Resolve the path and return. */ rval = FOUND; user_stat = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct stat)); /* Default value for cmnd, overridden below. */ if (user_cmnd == NULL) user_cmnd = NewArgv[0]; if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) { if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) path = def_secure_path; set_perms(PERM_RUNAS); rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path, def_ignore_dot); restore_perms(); if (rval != FOUND) { /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */ set_perms(PERM_USER); rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path, def_ignore_dot); restore_perms(); } } /* set user_args */ if (NewArgc > 1) { char *to, *from, **av; size_t size, n; /* Alloc and build up user_args. */ for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++) size += strlen(*av) + 1; user_args = emalloc(size); if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { /* * When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end * escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces * for sudoers matching and logging purposes. */ for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) { while (*from) { if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) from++; *to++ = *from++; } *to++ = ' '; } *--to = '\0'; } else { for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++) { n = strlcpy(to, *av, size - (to - user_args)); if (n >= size - (to - user_args)) fatalx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), "set_cmnd()"); to += n; *to++ = ' '; } *--to = '\0'; } } } if (strlen(user_cmnd) >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; fatal("%s", user_cmnd); } if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL) user_base++; else user_base = user_cmnd; if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND)) log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries")); debug_return_int(rval); } /* * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type. * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error. */ FILE * open_sudoers(const char *sudoers, bool doedit, bool *keepopen) { struct stat sb; FILE *fp = NULL; debug_decl(open_sudoers, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS); switch (sudo_secure_file(sudoers, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) { case SUDO_PATH_SECURE: /* * If we are expecting sudoers to be group readable by * SUDOERS_GID but it is not, we must open the file as root, * not uid 1. */ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && ISSET(sudoers_mode, S_IRGRP)) { if (!ISSET(sb.st_mode, S_IRGRP) || sb.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) { restore_perms(); set_perms(PERM_ROOT); } } /* * Open sudoers and make sure we can read it so we can present * the user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer). */ if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) { log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to open %s"), sudoers); } else { if (sb.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) { log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to read %s"), sudoers); fclose(fp); fp = NULL; } else { /* Rewind fp and set close on exec flag. */ rewind(fp); (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1); } } break; case SUDO_PATH_MISSING: log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to stat %s"), sudoers); break; case SUDO_PATH_BAD_TYPE: log_warning(0, N_("%s is not a regular file"), sudoers); break; case SUDO_PATH_WRONG_OWNER: log_warning(0, N_("%s is owned by uid %u, should be %u"), sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_uid, (unsigned int) sudoers_uid); break; case SUDO_PATH_WORLD_WRITABLE: log_warning(0, N_("%s is world writable"), sudoers); break; case SUDO_PATH_GROUP_WRITABLE: log_warning(0, N_("%s is owned by gid %u, should be %u"), sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_gid, (unsigned int) sudoers_gid); break; default: /* NOTREACHED */ break; } restore_perms(); /* change back to root */ debug_return_ptr(fp); } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H static void set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw) { const int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY; login_cap_t *lc; debug_decl(set_loginclass, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) if (!def_use_loginclass) debug_return; if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) { if (user_uid != 0 && pw->pw_uid != 0) fatalx(U_("only root can use `-c %s'"), login_class); } else { login_class = pw->pw_class; if (!login_class || !*login_class) login_class = (pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS; } /* Make sure specified login class is valid. */ lc = login_getclass(login_class); if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) { /* * Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login * class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets * corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it. */ if (login_class) log_fatal(errflags, N_("unknown login class: %s"), login_class); else log_warning(errflags, N_("unknown login class: %s"), login_class); def_use_loginclass = false; } login_close(lc); debug_return; } #else static void set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw) { } #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ #ifndef AI_FQDN # define AI_FQDN AI_CANONNAME #endif /* * Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost. * Use AI_FQDN if available since "canonical" is not always the same as fqdn. */ static void set_fqdn(void) { struct addrinfo *res0, hint; char *p; debug_decl(set_fqdn, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hint.ai_flags = AI_FQDN; if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) { log_warning(MSG_ONLY, N_("unable to resolve host %s"), user_host); } else { if (user_shost != user_host) efree(user_shost); efree(user_host); user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname); freeaddrinfo(res0); if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.')) != NULL) user_shost = estrndup(user_host, (size_t)(p - user_host)); else user_shost = user_host; } debug_return; } /* * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as * and store it in runas_pw. By default, commands run as "root". */ static void set_runaspw(const char *user) { struct passwd *pw = NULL; debug_decl(set_runaspw, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) if (*user == '#') { const char *errstr; uid_t uid = atoid(user + 1, NULL, NULL, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) { if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0); } } if (pw == NULL) { if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL) log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, N_("unknown user: %s"), user); } if (runas_pw != NULL) sudo_pw_delref(runas_pw); runas_pw = pw; debug_return; } /* * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as * and store it in runas_gr. */ static void set_runasgr(const char *group) { struct group *gr = NULL; debug_decl(set_runasgr, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) if (*group == '#') { const char *errstr; gid_t gid = atoid(group + 1, NULL, NULL, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) { if ((gr = sudo_getgrgid(gid)) == NULL) gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group); } } if (gr == NULL) { if ((gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL) log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, N_("unknown group: %s"), group); } if (runas_gr != NULL) sudo_gr_delref(runas_gr); runas_gr = gr; debug_return; } /* * Callback for runas_default sudoers setting. */ static int cb_runas_default(const char *user) { /* Only reset runaspw if user didn't specify one. */ if (!runas_user && !runas_group) set_runaspw(user); return true; } /* * Callback for sudoers_locale sudoers setting. */ static int cb_sudoers_locale(const char *locale) { sudoers_initlocale(NULL, locale); return true; } /* * Cleanup hook for fatal()/fatalx() */ void sudoers_cleanup(void) { struct sudo_nss *nss; debug_decl(sudoers_cleanup, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) if (snl != NULL) { TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) { nss->close(nss); } } if (def_group_plugin) group_plugin_unload(); sudo_endpwent(); sudo_endgrent(); debug_return; } static char * resolve_editor(const char *ed, size_t edlen, int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out) { char *cp, **nargv, *editor, *editor_path = NULL; int ac, i, nargc; bool wasblank; debug_decl(resolve_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) /* Note: editor becomes part of argv_out and is not freed. */ editor = emalloc(edlen + 1); memcpy(editor, ed, edlen); editor[edlen] = '\0'; /* * Split editor into an argument vector; editor is reused (do not free). * The EDITOR and VISUAL environment variables may contain command * line args so look for those and alloc space for them too. */ nargc = 1; for (wasblank = false, cp = editor; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (isblank((unsigned char) *cp)) wasblank = true; else if (wasblank) { wasblank = false; nargc++; } } /* If we can't find the editor in the user's PATH, give up. */ cp = strtok(editor, " \t"); if (cp == NULL || find_path(cp, &editor_path, NULL, getenv("PATH"), 0) != FOUND) { efree(editor); debug_return_str(NULL); } nargv = (char **) emalloc2(nargc + 1 + nfiles + 1, sizeof(char *)); for (ac = 0; cp != NULL && ac < nargc; ac++) { nargv[ac] = cp; cp = strtok(NULL, " \t"); } nargv[ac++] = "--"; for (i = 0; i < nfiles; ) nargv[ac++] = files[i++]; nargv[ac] = NULL; *argv_out = nargv; debug_return_str(editor_path); } /* * Determine which editor to use. We don't need to worry about restricting * this to a "safe" editor since it runs with the uid of the invoking user, * not the runas (privileged) user. */ static char * find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out) { const char *cp, *ep, *editor; char *editor_path = NULL, **ev, *ev0[4]; size_t len; debug_decl(find_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) /* * If any of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or EDITOR are set, choose the first one. */ ev0[0] = "SUDO_EDITOR"; ev0[1] = "VISUAL"; ev0[2] = "EDITOR"; ev0[3] = NULL; for (ev = ev0; editor_path == NULL && *ev != NULL; ev++) { if ((editor = getenv(*ev)) != NULL && *editor != '\0') { editor_path = resolve_editor(editor, strlen(editor), nfiles, files, argv_out); } } if (editor_path == NULL) { /* def_editor could be a path, split it up, avoiding strtok() */ cp = editor = def_editor; do { if ((ep = strchr(cp, ':')) != NULL) len = ep - cp; else len = strlen(cp); editor_path = resolve_editor(cp, len, nfiles, files, argv_out); cp = ep + 1; } while (ep != NULL && editor_path == NULL); } if (!editor_path) { audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), editor); warningx(U_("%s: command not found"), editor); } debug_return_str(editor_path); } #ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG static void create_admin_success_flag(void) { struct stat statbuf; char flagfile[PATH_MAX]; int fd, n; debug_decl(create_admin_success_flag, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN) /* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */ if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin")) debug_return; /* Build path to flag file. */ n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful", user_dir); if (n <= 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(flagfile)) debug_return; /* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */ set_perms(PERM_USER); if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) != 0) { fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644); close(fd); } restore_perms(); debug_return; } #else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */ static void create_admin_success_flag(void) { /* STUB */ } #endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */ static bool tty_present(void) { #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC2_P_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_P_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_KI_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_KP_EPROC_E_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_PSINFO_PR_TTYDEV) || defined(HAVE_PSTAT_GETPROC) || defined(__linux__) return user_ttypath != NULL; #else int fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); if (fd != -1) close(fd); return fd != -1; #endif }