/*
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2013 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*/
#define _SUDO_MAIN
#ifdef __TANDEM
# include <floss.h>
#endif
#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stddef.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
# include <login_cap.h>
# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
# ifndef LOGIN_SETENV
# define LOGIN_SETENV 0
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
# include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
# include "compat/getaddrinfo.h"
#endif
#include "sudoers.h"
#include "auth/sudo_auth.h"
#include "secure_path.h"
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static char *find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out);
static int cb_runas_default(const char *);
static int cb_sudoers_locale(const char *);
static int set_cmnd(void);
static void create_admin_success_flag(void);
static void init_vars(char * const *);
static void set_fqdn(void);
static void set_loginclass(struct passwd *);
static void set_runasgr(const char *);
static void set_runaspw(const char *);
static bool tty_present(void);
/*
* Globals
*/
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
struct passwd *list_pw;
int long_list;
uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
extern bool parse_error;
extern char *errorfile;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
int sudo_mode;
static char *prev_user;
static char *runas_user;
static char *runas_group;
static struct sudo_nss_list *snl;
/* XXX - must be extern for audit bits of sudo_auth.c */
int NewArgc;
char **NewArgv;
int
sudoers_policy_init(void *info, char * const envp[])
{
volatile int sources = 0;
struct sudo_nss *nss, *nss_next;
debug_decl(sudoers_policy_init, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
bindtextdomain("sudoers", LOCALEDIR);
sudo_setpwent();
sudo_setgrent();
/* Register fatal/fatalx callback. */
fatal_callback_register(sudoers_cleanup);
/* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */
env_init(envp);
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
/* Parse info from front-end. */
sudo_mode = sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(info, &runas_user, &runas_group);
init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */
/* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */
snl = sudo_read_nss();
/* LDAP or NSS may modify the euid so we need to be root for the open. */
set_perms(PERM_INITIAL);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
/* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */
for (nss = snl->first; nss != NULL; nss = nss_next) {
nss_next = nss->next;
if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) {
sources++;
if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0)
log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries"));
} else {
tq_remove(snl, nss);
}
}
if (sources == 0) {
warningx(_("no valid sudoers sources found, quitting"));
debug_return_bool(-1);
}
/* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */
/*
* Initialize external group plugin, if any.
*/
if (def_group_plugin) {
if (group_plugin_load(def_group_plugin) != true)
def_group_plugin = NULL;
}
/*
* Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers.
* Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we
* defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it.
*/
/* XXX - qpm4u does more here as it may have already set runas_pw */
if (runas_group != NULL) {
set_runasgr(runas_group);
if (runas_user != NULL)
set_runaspw(runas_user);
} else
set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default);
if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS))
log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries"));
if (def_fqdn)
set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */
/* Set login class if applicable. */
set_loginclass(runas_pw ? runas_pw : sudo_user.pw);
restore_perms();
debug_return_bool(true);
}
int
sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
void *closure)
{
char **edit_argv = NULL;
char *iolog_path = NULL;
mode_t cmnd_umask = 0777;
struct sudo_nss *nss;
int cmnd_status = -1, oldlocale, validated;
volatile int rval = true;
debug_decl(sudoers_policy_main, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* XXX - would like to move this to policy.c but need the cleanup. */
if (fatal_setjmp() != 0) {
/* error recovery via fatal(), fatalx() or log_fatal() */
rval = -1;
goto done;
}
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
warningx(_("sudoers specifies that root is not allowed to sudo"));
goto bad;
}
/* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
if (!def_closefrom_override) {
warningx(_("you are not permitted to use the -C option"));
goto bad;
}
def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
}
set_perms(PERM_INITIAL);
/* Environment variables specified on the command line. */
if (env_add != NULL && env_add[0] != NULL)
sudo_user.env_vars = env_add;
/*
* Make a local copy of argc/argv, with special handling
* for pseudo-commands and the '-i' option.
*/
if (argc == 0) {
NewArgc = 1;
NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 1, sizeof(char *));
NewArgv[0] = user_cmnd;
NewArgv[1] = NULL;
} else {
/* Must leave an extra slot before NewArgv for bash's --login */
NewArgc = argc;
NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 2, sizeof(char *));
memcpy(++NewArgv, argv, argc * sizeof(char *));
NewArgv[NewArgc] = NULL;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && runas_pw != NULL)
NewArgv[0] = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_shell);
}
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
def_preserve_groups = true;
/* Find command in path */
cmnd_status = set_cmnd();
/*
* Check sudoers sources, using the locale specified in sudoers.
*/
sudoers_setlocale(SUDOERS_LOCALE_SUDOERS, &oldlocale);
validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST;
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag);
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Handle [SUCCESS=return] */
if (nss->ret_if_found)
break;
} else {
/* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */
if (nss->ret_if_notfound)
break;
}
}
/* Restore user's locale. */
sudoers_setlocale(oldlocale, NULL);
if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
/* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */
if (runas_pw == NULL)
set_runaspw(user_name);
/*
* Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
if (def_timestampowner) {
struct passwd *pw;
if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
else
pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
if (pw != NULL) {
timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
sudo_pw_delref(pw);
} else {
log_warning(0, N_("timestamp owner (%s): No such user"),
def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = ROOT_UID;
}
}
/* If no command line args and "shell_noargs" is not set, error out. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) {
rval = -2; /* usage error */
goto done;
}
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_requiretty && !tty_present()) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("no tty"));
warningx(_("sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"));
goto bad;
}
/*
* We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user
* specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs.
*/
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) ||
(ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv))
def_env_reset = false;
/* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
rebuild_env();
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
rval = check_user(validated, sudo_mode);
if (rval != true) {
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK))
log_denial(validated, false);
goto done;
}
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
/* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
if (sudo_user.pw != NULL)
sudo_pw_delref(sudo_user.pw);
sudo_user.pw = pw;
}
}
}
/* If the user was not allowed to run the command we are done. */
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
log_failure(validated, cmnd_status);
goto bad;
}
/* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */
create_admin_success_flag();
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("command in current directory"));
warningx(_("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
goto bad;
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]);
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), NewArgv[0]);
} else {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
}
goto bad;
}
/* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
warningx(_("sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"));
goto bad;
} else
validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))) {
if ((def_log_input || def_log_output) && def_iolog_file && def_iolog_dir) {
const char prefix[] = "iolog_path=";
iolog_path = expand_iolog_path(prefix, def_iolog_dir,
def_iolog_file, &sudo_user.iolog_file);
sudo_user.iolog_file++;
}
}
log_allowed(validated);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK))
rval = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST))
display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); /* XXX - return val */
/* Cleanup sudoers sources */
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
nss->close(nss);
}
if (def_group_plugin)
group_plugin_unload();
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) {
/* rval already set appropriately */
goto done;
}
/*
* Set umask based on sudoers.
* If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too
* unless umask_override is set.
*/
if (def_umask != 0777) {
cmnd_umask = def_umask;
if (!def_umask_override)
cmnd_umask |= user_umask;
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
char *p;
/* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
p = NewArgv[0];
*p = '-';
NewArgv[0] = p;
/*
* Newer versions of bash require the --login option to be used
* in conjunction with the -c option even if the shell name starts
* with a '-'. Unfortunately, bash 1.x uses -login, not --login
* so this will cause an error for that.
*/
if (NewArgc > 1 && strcmp(NewArgv[0], "-bash") == 0 &&
strcmp(NewArgv[1], "-c") == 0) {
/* Use the extra slot before NewArgv so we can store --login. */
NewArgv--;
NewArgc++;
NewArgv[0] = NewArgv[1];
NewArgv[1] = "--login";
}
#if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM))
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
/* Set environment based on login class. */
if (login_class) {
login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (lc != NULL) {
setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV);
login_close(lc);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
}
/* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
if (def_env_file)
read_env_file(def_env_file, false);
/* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
efree(safe_cmnd);
safe_cmnd = find_editor(NewArgc - 1, NewArgv + 1, &edit_argv);
if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
goto bad;
}
/* Must audit before uid change. */
audit_success(NewArgv);
/* Setup execution environment to pass back to front-end. */
rval = sudoers_policy_exec_setup(edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv,
env_get(), cmnd_umask, iolog_path, closure);
/* Zero out stashed copy of environment, it is owned by the front-end. */
env_init(NULL);
goto done;
bad:
rval = false;
done:
fatal_disable_setjmp();
rewind_perms();
/* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
debug_return_bool(rval);
}
/*
* Initialize timezone and fill in ``sudo_user'' struct.
*/
static void
init_vars(char * const envp[])
{
char * const * ep;
debug_decl(init_vars, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
sudoers_initlocale(setlocale(LC_ALL, NULL), def_sudoers_locale);
for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) {
/* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */
switch (**ep) {
case 'K':
if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0)
user_ccname = *ep + 11;
break;
case 'P':
if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0)
user_path = *ep + 5;
break;
case 'S':
if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0)
user_prompt = *ep + 12;
else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
prev_user = *ep + 10;
break;
}
}
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd if we don't already
* have one.
*/
if (sudo_user.pw == NULL) {
if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwnam(user_name)) == NULL) {
/*
* It is not unusual for users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout
* file which can cause sudo to be run during reboot after the
* YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
*/
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE)
fatalx(_("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid);
/* Need to make a fake struct passwd for the call to log_fatal(). */
sudo_user.pw = sudo_mkpwent(user_name, user_uid, user_gid, NULL, NULL);
log_fatal(0, N_("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
/*
* Get group list.
*/
if (user_group_list == NULL)
user_group_list = sudo_get_grlist(sudo_user.pw);
/* Set runas callback. */
sudo_defs_table[I_RUNAS_DEFAULT].callback = cb_runas_default;
/* Set locale callback. */
sudo_defs_table[I_SUDOERS_LOCALE].callback = cb_sudoers_locale;
/* Set maxseq callback. */
sudo_defs_table[I_MAXSEQ].callback = io_set_max_sessid;
/* It is now safe to use log_fatal() and set_perms() */
debug_return;
}
/*
* Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables
* and apply any command-specific defaults entries.
*/
static int
set_cmnd(void)
{
int rval;
char *path = user_path;
debug_decl(set_cmnd, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* Resolve the path and return. */
rval = FOUND;
user_stat = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct stat));
/* Default value for cmnd, overridden below. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt())
path = def_secure_path;
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
def_ignore_dot);
restore_perms();
if (rval != FOUND) {
/* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
set_perms(PERM_USER);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
def_ignore_dot);
restore_perms();
}
}
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, *from, **av;
size_t size, n;
/* Alloc and build up user_args. */
for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++)
size += strlen(*av) + 1;
user_args = emalloc(size);
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
/*
* When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end
* escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces
* for sudoers matching and logging purposes.
*/
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
while (*from) {
if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
from++;
*to++ = *from++;
}
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
} else {
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++) {
n = strlcpy(to, *av, size - (to - user_args));
if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
fatalx(_("internal error, %s overflow"), "set_cmnd()");
to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
}
}
if (strlen(user_cmnd) >= PATH_MAX) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
fatal("%s", user_cmnd);
}
if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
user_base++;
else
user_base = user_cmnd;
if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND))
log_warning(NO_STDERR, N_("problem with defaults entries"));
debug_return_int(rval);
}
/*
* Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type.
* Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error.
*/
FILE *
open_sudoers(const char *sudoers, bool doedit, bool *keepopen)
{
struct stat sb;
FILE *fp = NULL;
debug_decl(open_sudoers, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
switch (sudo_secure_file(sudoers, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) {
case SUDO_PATH_SECURE:
/*
* If we are expecting sudoers to be group readable but
* it is not, we must open the file as root, not uid 1.
*/
if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP)) {
if ((sb.st_mode & S_IRGRP) == 0) {
restore_perms();
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
}
}
/*
* Open sudoers and make sure we can read it so we can present
* the user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
*/
if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) {
log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to open %s"), sudoers);
} else {
if (sb.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) {
log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to read %s"),
sudoers);
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
} else {
/* Rewind fp and set close on exec flag. */
rewind(fp);
(void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1);
}
}
break;
case SUDO_PATH_MISSING:
log_warning(USE_ERRNO, N_("unable to stat %s"), sudoers);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_BAD_TYPE:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is not a regular file"), sudoers);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_WRONG_OWNER:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is owned by uid %u, should be %u"),
sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_uid, (unsigned int) sudoers_uid);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_WORLD_WRITABLE:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is world writable"), sudoers);
break;
case SUDO_PATH_GROUP_WRITABLE:
log_warning(0, N_("%s is owned by gid %u, should be %u"),
sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_gid, (unsigned int) sudoers_gid);
break;
default:
/* NOTREACHED */
break;
}
restore_perms(); /* change back to root */
debug_return_ptr(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
static void
set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw)
{
const int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
login_cap_t *lc;
debug_decl(set_loginclass, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (!def_use_loginclass)
debug_return;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
if (user_uid != 0 &&
strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0)
fatalx(_("only root can use `-c %s'"), login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
login_class =
(pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
}
/* Make sure specified login class is valid. */
lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) {
/*
* Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
* class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
* corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
*/
if (login_class)
log_fatal(errflags, N_("unknown login class: %s"), login_class);
else
log_warning(errflags, N_("unknown login class: %s"), login_class);
def_use_loginclass = false;
}
login_close(lc);
debug_return;
}
#else
static void
set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw)
{
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifndef AI_FQDN
# define AI_FQDN AI_CANONNAME
#endif
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
* Use AI_FQDN if available since "canonical" is not always the same as fqdn.
*/
static void
set_fqdn(void)
{
struct addrinfo *res0, hint;
char *p;
debug_decl(set_fqdn, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint));
hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hint.ai_flags = AI_FQDN;
if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) {
log_warning(MSG_ONLY, N_("unable to resolve host %s"), user_host);
} else {
if (user_shost != user_host)
efree(user_shost);
efree(user_host);
user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname);
freeaddrinfo(res0);
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.')) != NULL)
user_shost = estrndup(user_host, (size_t)(p - user_host));
else
user_shost = user_host;
}
debug_return;
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as
* and store it in runas_pw. By default, commands run as "root".
*/
static void
set_runaspw(const char *user)
{
debug_decl(set_runaspw, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (runas_pw != NULL)
sudo_pw_delref(runas_pw);
if (*user == '#') {
if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL)
runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0);
} else {
if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, N_("unknown user: %s"), user);
}
debug_return;
}
/*
* Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as
* and store it in runas_gr.
*/
static void
set_runasgr(const char *group)
{
debug_decl(set_runasgr, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (runas_gr != NULL)
sudo_gr_delref(runas_gr);
if (*group == '#') {
if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL)
runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group);
} else {
if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, N_("unknown group: %s"), group);
}
debug_return;
}
/*
* Callback for runas_default sudoers setting.
*/
static int
cb_runas_default(const char *user)
{
/* Only reset runaspw if user didn't specify one. */
if (!runas_user && !runas_group)
set_runaspw(user);
return true;
}
/*
* Callback for sudoers_locale sudoers setting.
*/
static int
cb_sudoers_locale(const char *locale)
{
sudoers_initlocale(NULL, locale);
return true;
}
/*
* Cleanup hook for fatal()/fatalx()
*/
void
sudoers_cleanup(void)
{
struct sudo_nss *nss;
debug_decl(sudoers_cleanup, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
if (snl != NULL) {
tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
nss->close(nss);
}
if (def_group_plugin)
group_plugin_unload();
sudo_endpwent();
sudo_endgrent();
debug_return;
}
static char *
resolve_editor(const char *ed, size_t edlen, int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out)
{
char *cp, **nargv, *editor, *editor_path = NULL;
int ac, i, nargc;
bool wasblank;
debug_decl(resolve_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* Note: editor becomes part of argv_out and is not freed. */
editor = emalloc(edlen + 1);
memcpy(editor, ed, edlen);
editor[edlen] = '\0';
/*
* Split editor into an argument vector; editor is reused (do not free).
* The EDITOR and VISUAL environment variables may contain command
* line args so look for those and alloc space for them too.
*/
nargc = 1;
for (wasblank = false, cp = editor; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (isblank((unsigned char) *cp))
wasblank = true;
else if (wasblank) {
wasblank = false;
nargc++;
}
}
/* If we can't find the editor in the user's PATH, give up. */
cp = strtok(editor, " \t");
if (cp == NULL ||
find_path(cp, &editor_path, NULL, getenv("PATH"), 0) != FOUND) {
efree(editor);
debug_return_str(NULL);
}
nargv = (char **) emalloc2(nargc + 1 + nfiles + 1, sizeof(char *));
for (ac = 0; cp != NULL && ac < nargc; ac++) {
nargv[ac] = cp;
cp = strtok(NULL, " \t");
}
nargv[ac++] = "--";
for (i = 0; i < nfiles; )
nargv[ac++] = files[i++];
nargv[ac] = NULL;
*argv_out = nargv;
debug_return_str(editor_path);
}
/*
* Determine which editor to use. We don't need to worry about restricting
* this to a "safe" editor since it runs with the uid of the invoking user,
* not the runas (privileged) user.
*/
static char *
find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out)
{
const char *cp, *ep, *editor;
char *editor_path = NULL, **ev, *ev0[4];
size_t len;
debug_decl(find_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/*
* If any of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or EDITOR are set, choose the first one.
*/
ev0[0] = "SUDO_EDITOR";
ev0[1] = "VISUAL";
ev0[2] = "EDITOR";
ev0[3] = NULL;
for (ev = ev0; editor_path == NULL && *ev != NULL; ev++) {
if ((editor = getenv(*ev)) != NULL && *editor != '\0') {
editor_path = resolve_editor(editor, strlen(editor), nfiles,
files, argv_out);
}
}
if (editor_path == NULL) {
/* def_editor could be a path, split it up, avoiding strtok() */
cp = editor = def_editor;
do {
if ((ep = strchr(cp, ':')) != NULL)
len = ep - cp;
else
len = strlen(cp);
editor_path = resolve_editor(cp, len, nfiles, files, argv_out);
cp = ep + 1;
} while (ep != NULL && editor_path == NULL);
}
if (!editor_path) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"), editor);
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), editor);
}
debug_return_str(editor_path);
}
#ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG
static void
create_admin_success_flag(void)
{
struct stat statbuf;
char flagfile[PATH_MAX];
int fd, n;
debug_decl(create_admin_success_flag, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
/* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */
if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin"))
debug_return;
/* Build path to flag file. */
n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful",
user_dir);
if (n <= 0 || n >= sizeof(flagfile))
debug_return;
/* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */
set_perms(PERM_USER);
if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) != 0) {
fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644);
close(fd);
}
restore_perms();
debug_return;
}
#else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
static void
create_admin_success_flag(void)
{
/* STUB */
}
#endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
static bool
tty_present(void)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC2_P_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_P_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_KI_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_KINFO_PROC_KP_EPROC_E_TDEV) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_PSINFO_PR_TTYDEV) || defined(HAVE_PSTAT_GETPROC) || defined(__linux__)
return user_ttypath != NULL;
#else
int fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
return fd != -1;
#endif
}
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